Translation: কেন চোখের জলে

Rabindra Sangeet on regret: https://youtu.be/y3bxUIupgew

কেন চোখের জলে ভিজিয়ে দিলেম না শুকনো ধুলো যত!
Why didn’t I wet all this dry dust with my tears?

কে জানিত আসবে তুমি গো অনাহূতের মতো ॥
Who knew you would come in, my dear, like the uninvited?

তুমি পার হয়ে এসেছ মরু, নাই যে সেথায় ছায়াতরু–
You have come crossing the desert, where there is no shadowy tree

পথের দুঃখ দিলেম তোমায় গো এমন ভাগ্যহত ॥
The road’s sorrow I gave you, my dear, that’s how luckless.

তখন আলসেতে বসে ছিলেম আমি আপন ঘরের ছায়ে,
While at leisure I was sitting in the shade of my house

জানি নাই যে তোমায় কত ব্যথা বাজবে পায়ে পায়ে।
I didn’t know how much pain will sing with every step

তবু ওই বেদনা আমার বুকে বেজেছিল গোপন দুখে–
Still, that pain, in my breast, sang in secret sorrow

দাগ দিয়েছে মর্মে আমার গো গভীর হৃদয়ক্ষত ॥
It scarred me to my being, my dear, a deep heart wound.

Materialist Economics, Part 5: Concluding Remarks

This proposal is not fully communist in the way Marx imagined. It does not abolish all market exchange. It does not assume perfect social harmony. What it offers is a framework in which the productive capacity of society is directed by the people who depend on it, backed by empirical science.

The disagreements with Marx that motivate this proposal are technical, not fundamental. The criticism of capitalism and imperialism stands. A thorough overhaul of society is necessary, but the state retains uses even after revolution. A non-state society likely cannot prevent armed groups from installing themselves as a ruling class. At the same time, the Leninist vanguard has no mechanism remain accountable to the masses.

Skepticism toward both institutional vacuum and Leninism’s institutional monopoly is what drives the design described here: a divided state, powerful enough to enforce the will of the people, too divided within itself to conspire against them.

The capitalist class structure should be abolished. (Part 1, “The Class Structure as Statistical Regularity,” showed that this structure, an exponential distribution of wage income and a Pareto power-law tail of capital income, is a statistical regularity arising from the conservation laws governing exchange and accumulation.) There would still be differentiation in the general sense that different people will gravitate toward different professions, but not the specific structure in which one class owns the means of production and another class must sell its labor to survive. That structure is what this proposal dismantles by providing an alternative that renders it powerless.

This proposal does not promise utopia. It offers an institutional structure designed to prevent the specific failures (concentration of economic power, concentration of political power, production for profit rather than for use) that make the present arrangement intolerable. The only plausible way forward is a mass movement with a concrete proposal whose effects are close enough to what has been described here.

The economy should be planned. It should not be planned by a party bureau or left to the anarchy of the market. It should be planned in a manner accountable to the people who live and work within it.

Materialist Economics, Part 4: Objections and Responses

  1. The Motivation Problem

If necessary goods are readily available, why would anyone work at all? The objection rests on the premise that necessary goods are freely distributed. They are not. They are produced by the government sector and sold at public stores in exchange for labor vouchers. A person who does not work does not receive vouchers and cannot purchase goods beyond whatever minimal subsistence the society chooses to guarantee. The proposal eliminates starvation as a disciplinary mechanism (no one is left to die for lack of employment) but it does not eliminate the distinction between having a comfortable standard of living and not working at all. What the economy does is make goods cheap so that a relatively modest amount of work is sufficient to live a comfortable life.

Beyond material incentives, people work for reasons other than the avoidance of destitution: respect, recognition, meaning, practical necessity. People whose essential needs are met are often willing to do unpleasant work (shoveling snow, cleaning public spaces, repairing infrastructure) when they see the connection between their effort and their community’s well-being. The belief that people will not work without coercion reflects the capitalist experience of alienated labor, not a universal truth about human nature. People get joy and meaning from their work.

The proposal does not require everyone to be altruistic. It requires only that people respond to ordinary incentives: a better standard of living, the esteem of their community, and the practical need for the goods they consume.

As for why anyone would work for a capitalist under these conditions, they largely would not, and that is the point. The government sector provides a permanent exit from private employment. The goal is a society that produces enough goods in large enough quantities that everything is relatively cheap, freeing people to pursue projects they care about.

  1. The Labor Voucher Objection

Andrew Kliman, in a close reading of Marx’s Critique of the Gotha Programme (Kliman, “The Critique of the Gotha Program on Capitalism vs. Communism,” Journal of Global Faultlines, Vol. 9, No. 2, 2022, pp. 107–125), argues that labor vouchers can function only when labor is “directly social.” That is, when the means of production are already commonly held, value relations have been eliminated, and the exchange of commodities has ceased.

Recall the distinction introduced in Section 8 of Part 3. Labor is “directly social” when production is organized collectively and each person’s contribution is recognized as part of the social total from the outset. Labor is “indirectly social” when producers work independently and their labor counts as socially useful only if their product successfully sells on the market.

In Kliman’s reading, Marx’s labor certificates pertain exclusively to a society that has already undergone a complete revolutionary transformation of its economic foundation. The proposals Marx criticized as unviable, those of the Ricardian socialists and Proudhonists, attempted to institute equal exchange in a society where labor was only indirectly social and commodity production persisted. Marx held that the revolutionary transformation of the economic basis made exchange relations viable that had been unviable in a commodity-producing society.

The crux of Kliman’s argument is a base-superstructure claim. In Marx’s framework, the “base” (Basis) is the ensemble of economic relations: who owns the means of production, how labor is organized, and how surplus is extracted. The “superstructure” (Überbau) is the set of political, legal, and ideological institutions that arise on this foundation. Marx’s thesis is that the base determines the superstructure. You cannot transform an economy by passing laws if the underlying property relations remain unchanged.

Kliman applies this thesis directly. Political and legal changes (passing a law that institutes labor vouchers) cannot by themselves transform the economic basis of society. If the underlying relations of production remain capitalist, the superstructural reform will either fail or reproduce capitalist dynamics under a new name. This is the lesson Marx drew from the failures of the Ricardian socialists and Proudhonists.

The Ricardian socialists (Thomas Hodgskin, William Thompson, John Francis Bray) accepted Ricardo’s labor theory of value and concluded that since labor creates all value, workers should receive the full product of their labor. They proposed labor-note schemes that would allow producers to exchange goods at their labor-time equivalents. Proudhon similarly proposed “exchange banks” that would issue labor-money certificates, abolishing profit and interest while retaining individual commodity production. Marx argued that both groups made the same error. They tried to institute equal exchange in a society where labor was only indirectly social and commodity production persisted, where the law of value operated behind the backs of producers. Their proposals were unviable precisely because the economic basis had not been transformed.

Accountable planning agrees with this reasoning. It does not propose labor vouchers as a reform within an otherwise unchanged capitalist economy. The government sector constitutes a new economic basis with new relations of production. The means of production are commonly held. Workers do not sell their labor-power to an employer in exchange for wages. They contribute labor to common production and receive a certificate of that contribution. Products do not belong to individual producers and are not exchanged as commodities. They go directly to the social stock and are distributed through public stores. The voucher is not a unit of exchange mediating between independent producers (which is what Proudhon’s labor-money was) but a certificate of contribution within a planned, collectively organized production process. This is exactly the structure Marx described in the Critique of the Gotha Programme: “Within the collective society based on common ownership of the means of production, the producers do not exchange their products; just as little does the labour employed on the products appear here as the value of these products.”

Marx illustrated what this kind of transparent labor-time accounting looks like in his Robinson Crusoe passage in Capital (Volume I, Chapter 1, Section 4). Crusoe keeps a ledger recording the labor time different products have cost him. Marx’s point is that when production is organized by a single agent (or a single community), labor-time accounting is direct and transparent. It does not require the mediation of exchange value, and the law of value does not operate. The planning computation described in Section 3 of Part 3 achieves the same transparency at social scale. The input-output table makes the production structure visible, the contractive algorithm computes the labor content of every product. The resulting plan allocates labor directly rather than through the mediation of market prices. This is not value operating behind the backs of the producers. It is labor-time accounting operating in front of them.

Although marginal markets do exist, the means of production are collectivized in practice since they are fully subordinated to the democratic government. The labor voucher system does not extend to the private sector and does not need to.

Marx himself described the lower phase of communism as a society that “emerges from capitalist society” and is “in every respect, economically, morally, and intellectually, still stamped with the birthmarks of the old society from whose womb it emerges.” The persistence of a capitalist remainder with indirectly social labor is not a departure from Marx’s vision of the lower phase. It is what he predicted. The important difference is not between a pure communist economy and a mixed one, but between an economy where the directly social sector is dominant and growing and one where it is absent. In accountable planning, the directly social sector is the government sector; it is the primary employer. It reduces the capitalist remainder as necessary.

The practical objection, that vouchers denominated in labor time would be unworkable alongside a private sector using money, is addressed by the structural separation of the two circuits. The government sector’s accounting is in labor time. The private sector’s accounting is in whatever money it uses. The two do not need to be convertible. Workers choose which sector to work in. The presence of two coexisting systems of remuneration is no more paradoxical than the informal sector that operated under its own accounting alongside every historical system of central planning, or the coexistence of public and private healthcare systems in many countries today.

  1. The Heterogeneous Labor Problem

Labor vouchers denominated in hours face the problem of heterogeneous labor. If a brain surgeon and a janitor both receive vouchers for each hour worked, either the surgeon is massively underpaid relative to the cost of training, or some multiplier must be applied to skilled labor. Marx acknowledged this problem in the Critique of the Gotha Programme (1875), noting that “one man is superior to another physically or mentally” and calling this a “defect” of the lower phase of communism.

The answer is to treat skilled labor the same way the labor-value framework treats any other produced input. Compute the labor time required to produce it. Training a skilled worker requires social labor time (years of education, supervised practice, institutional support). That training cost is amortized over the worker’s career, yielding a computable multiplier.

Say training a surgeon requires approximately 30,000 hours of socially provided education and supervised residency (roughly four years of undergraduate education, four years of medical school, and five years of residency). The surgeon works approximately 60,000 hours over a thirty-year career. Each hour of the surgeon’s labor then counts as 1.5 hours of simple labor for accounting purposes: 30,000 training hours divided by 60,000 career hours equals a 0.5 increment, so each hour counts as 1 + 0.5 = 1.5 hours of simple labor.

Cockshott and Cottrell (Towards a New Socialism, 1993, Chapter 2, pp. 33–37) develop this approach in detail, treating skilled labor as labor whose production required additional social labor time and computing the reduction coefficients from educational statistics. This does not require market-determined wages. The approach is also supported by Wright’s agent-based models in Classical Econophysics (Routledge, 2009, Chapter 9), which demonstrate that in a simple commodity economy, heterogeneous reduction coefficients converge dynamically toward homogeneity as labor reallocates across sectors. This convergence is a consequence of the law of value (see Part 1, “Why the Regularity Holds”).

Engels made a stronger argument in Anti-Dühring (1878, Part II, Chapter VI, “Simple and Compound Labour”). In a socialist society, the costs of training the skilled worker are borne by society rather than by the individual or their family. The greater values produced by compound labor therefore belong to society, and “the worker himself has no claim to extra pay.” Engels allows no wage differential at all. Cockshott and Cottrell depart from him. Their multiplier does grant extra pay, but computes it from the social labor time invested in training: 1.5x for a surgeon, not the 10x–20x salary differential that capitalist labor markets generate through credentialing barriers and restricted access to education. This proposal follows Cockshott and Cottrell.

Workers in training receive subsistence support from the government sector, following from the existing guarantee of a minimal subsistence floor. The training cost is borne socially. Marx called the persistence of such differentials a defect of the lower phase, not a fatal flaw. It is a residual inequality that diminishes as education becomes universally accessible and training costs fall.

  1. The Danger of Capitalist Counter-Revolution

If a portion of the economy remains capitalist, those capitalists could accumulate political power and attempt to overthrow the democratic government. This objection points toward a renewal of class conflict. According to Leninism, it points toward the necessity of a vanguard party to manage it.

The mechanism of periodic confiscation, the reduction of accumulated assets whenever they exceed a constitutionally defined threshold, is designed to prevent the emergence of a capitalist class powerful enough to mount a serious political challenge. The cap on accumulation is not passive. It is enforced by an independent body with judicial oversight. The capitalist part of the economy lives under the credible threat of its assets being seized if they exceed the threshold.

The divided structure of the government prevents any single faction, including one aligned with capitalist interests, from capturing the state. As the secretaries are not members of a single party and are legally required to carry out the will of the people, a capitalist faction cannot simply buy or co-opt the government the way it can under a system where party funding determines electoral outcomes. The government’s internal divisions make coordinated corruption more difficult than under a party-state monopoly.

Most importantly, the government sector provides workers with a permanent exit from private employment. Under capitalism, employers derive political power not only from their wealth but from the fact that workers depend on them for survival. Under this proposal, that dependency is broken. Workers who can leave for the government sector at any time cannot be mobilized politically on behalf of their employer’s interests. The social base for a capitalist counter-revolution is structurally undermined.

Regarding the vanguard party: some organized force must oversee the transition. However, this force must not remain a single party that mediates between the masses and policy makers indefinitely. The divided government is designed to represent the working class and oversee the transition without concentrating power in a self-selecting elite.

Historically, vanguard parties transform into labor aristocracies over time because the institutional structure provides no mechanism for accountability to the masses.

  1. The Historical Objection

Every previous attempt at socialism ended in despotism.

This is true. However, every previous attempt at socialism followed a party-supremacist model in which a single organization held a monopoly on political power. This proposal does not. It enshrines constitutional human rights, divides the government against itself, and does not attempt complete collectivization in one step.

The institutional structure of divided government, independent courts, constitutional entrenchment of civil liberties, and no ruling party is designed to prevent the concentration of power that turned those systems despotic.

The nomenklatura arose because party membership was the sole path to administrative authority. In accountable planning, secretaries are hired employees from no single party. Their fragmentation prevents the formation of a coordinated ruling stratum (see Section 4 of Part 3).

In Soviet economic planning, the party bureau determined not only what was produced but how and by whom. In accountable planning, the plan is set by popular vote and local production decisions are left to workers (see Section 3 of Part 3).

Accountable planning constitutionally protects dissent. The divided government structure preserves competing centers of power by design (see Section 1 of Part 3).

The Soviet attempt to plan the economy produced a black market that corroded the system’s legitimacy. Accountable planning does not criminalize exchange (see Section 8 of Part 3).

Each of the historically observed failure modes corresponds to a specific institutional feature this proposal either omits or structurally prevents. This is why objections from historical attempts don’t apply to accountable planning.

  1. The Public Choice Objection

The public choice tradition in economics (Buchanan and Tullock, The Calculus of Consent, 1962; Downs, An Economic Theory of Democracy, 1957; Tullock, Toward a Mathematics of Politics, 1967; Caplan, The Myth of the Rational Voter, 2007) identifies several pathologies of democratic decision-making: rational ignorance, logrolling, rent-seeking, and the tendency of concentrated interests to dominate diffuse ones. Accountable planning is designed to address each pathology:

Rational ignorance is the tendency of voters not to inform themselves because the cost of learning exceeds the benefit of a single vote. It’s reduced because the proposal involves direct voting on goods categories, not representative voting on candidates or complex legislation. When a voter votes for “more housing,” they are expressing an economic demand. This is the equivalent of spending money under capitalism. They are not evaluating a macroeconomic policy platform. Caplan’s critique of voter irrationality specifically targets voters’ systematic biases about policy mechanisms (protectionism, make-work bias, pessimistic bias, anti-foreign bias), not their knowledge of what goods they want. Under this proposal, voters are not asked to design trade policy or evaluate fiscal multipliers. They are asked what they need more of.

Logrolling is legislators trading votes on different issues to build coalitions, often producing outcomes no majority actually wants. It’s eliminated because there are no legislators in the production-voting mechanism. Citizens vote directly on goods categories. The quadratic voting mechanism further limits strategic behavior because concentrating votes is costly. A bloc that attempts to dominate one category pays a quadratic price for doing so, leaving it with fewer credits to influence other categories.

Rent-seeking is the use of political influence to capture economic benefits without producing corresponding value. Secretaries could favor certain producers. Regions could attempt to game the voting system. The divided government structure, with no ruling party and secretaries who are employees rather than politicians, reduces the institutional surface area for capture. Independent courts adjudicate disputes. Secretaries who fail to follow the law are fired.

Moreover, no system eliminates rent-seeking entirely. The relevant comparison is not between this proposal and a rent-free ideal but between this proposal and capitalism, where rent-seeking is structurally rewarded through lobbying, regulatory capture, and campaign finance. Donald Wittman argued in The Myth of Democratic Failure (University of Chicago Press, 1995) that nearly all arguments claiming economic markets are efficient apply with equal force to democratic political markets. Models of political failure are not more valid than analogous arguments for market failure. Public choice critiques of democratic planning apply with no less force to capitalist markets, where purchasing-power-weighted “voting” is subject to all the same pathologies plus the additional distortion of radically unequal endowments.

  1. Frequently Asked Questions

“Is this a planned economy?”

Yes. It is not a centrally planned economy in the Soviet sense, where a party bureau determines what is produced, how, and by whom. It is an accountably planned economy, where the plan is set by popular vote and enforced by a divided government. What is produced is determined from the bottom, through quadratic voting on goods categories. The planning bureau computes balanced production targets from the input-output tables, using a contractive affine transform that converges in approximately twenty iterations and requires less information transmission than the market’s price-adjustment process (see Section 3 of Part 3 for the full argument). The government sets what must be produced. The producers determine how. The planners are accountable to the people; the people are not accountable to the planners.

“Doesn’t government intervention take away the freedom of individuals?”

For workers, the proposal expands freedom. It gives them a permanent alternative to selling their labor on terms dictated by capital. Following laws enacted by popular vote is categorically different from obeying a private individual who holds the power to deprive you of your livelihood. The former only constrains you to fulfill the economic demands of fellow workers.

“What about the individual whose preferences are consistently outvoted?”

The voting mechanism allocates government-sector production, not all production. Individuals retain the constitutional right to produce goods using their own labor and any non-expropriated means of production. A craftsperson, an artist, or a small producer of niche goods is not prevented from working by this proposal.

The quadratic voting mechanism specifically protects minority preferences. A citizen who cares intensely about a niche good can concentrate vote credits on that category. The quadratic cost structure makes it expensive for a majority to dominate every category.

As goods become abundant and cheap through government production of necessities, more labor time is freed for discretionary pursuits. A society that has solved the problem of food, housing, healthcare, and education has more room for minority tastes, not less.

“What about the environment?”

Under capitalism, environmental protection is difficult for reasons that are built into the system. Businesses that internalize environmental costs are at a competitive disadvantage against those that do not. Workers who depend on polluting industries cannot afford to vote for regulations that would eliminate their jobs.

In accountable planning, the people can vote directly for environmental protection. The government creates jobs in the relevant sectors: reforestation, renewable energy, sustainable agriculture, ecological remediation. Most voters want more greenery. Under capitalism, many can’t afford it.

Workers displaced from polluting industries can transition to government-sector employment. The perverse incentive structure that forces workers to choose between their livelihood and their environment is eliminated.

“What about automation?”

Under capitalism, automation threatens workers because the gains flow to capital owners. Under accountable planning, the gains flow to workers. If machines reduce the labor needed to produce a given quantity of goods, the goods become cheaper (their labor-time cost falls). The purchasing power of every labor voucher rises. The same hour of work buys more.

Automated production still requires workers to oversee, maintain, repair, program, and improve the machines. These oversight hours are labor, and they are compensated by labor vouchers like any other work.

What changes is the ratio of output to labor input. One hour of oversight may yield what ten hours of manual work once did. As this ratio increases, workers can choose to work fewer hours. If twenty hours of labor per week produce what forty hours once did, the population can choose to produce the same output with half the working time, or double the output with the same working time, or any combination. The decision is political, not imposed by the profit calculations of capital owners. Automation becomes a liberation from drudgery rather than a source of mass unemployment.

Materialist Economics, Part 3: Accountable Planning

  1. Constitutional Human Rights and the Rule of Law

Without protected human rights, it is impossible to know the will of the people. Any system of democratic production requires, as a precondition, constitutional protections for speech, assembly, and political participation. The rule of law must be upheld. Legal challenges must meet reasonable evidential standards, and accusations of wrongdoing must be resolved through due process.

This requirement is not ornamental. The entire proposal depends on the premise that production should be directed by popular will. But popular will can only be ascertained under conditions where people are free to express it. If a government can imprison critics, shut down independent media, or rig polling mechanisms, then “production by popular vote” becomes production by decree.

Human rights must be constitutionally entrenched. Not granted by the government of the day but prior to it, binding on all officeholders, enforceable by independent courts. Without this, the government described below has no foundation. We cannot risk the temporary suppression of opposition becoming a permanent one.

  1. Democratic Job Creation

To enforce accountability, the government polls the people on what goods and services they want. It then creates jobs in the relevant industries to produce those goods. Subsidizing production by popular vote directly replaces the purchasing-power filter with a democratic one. What counts as demand is no longer determined by who has the most capital. It is determined by what people actually need.

The polling mechanism works as follows. Every citizen receives an equal budget of vote credits. No one can vote for their own products. Citizens allocate their credits across goods categories. The cost of casting additional votes on a single category rises quadratically: casting n votes on one category costs n-squared credits. This is quadratic voting, a mechanism proposed by E. Glen Weyl and proved by Lalley and Weyl (2018) to yield approximately Pareto-efficient outcomes under standard assumptions. (An outcome is Pareto-efficient if no one can be made better off without making someone else worse off; the quadratic cost structure approximates this condition because it forces voters to internalize the social cost of their influence over each category.) The quadratic cost structure has two critical properties. First, it captures the intensity of preferences, not just their direction: a citizen who desperately needs housing can concentrate credits there, while someone with many moderate needs spreads credits across categories. Second, it protects minority preferences. Because concentrating votes is costly, no bloc can cheaply dominate all categories. An intense minority exerts disproportionate influence in its area of greatest need.

Arrow’s impossibility theorem, which establishes that no ranked voting system can simultaneously satisfy a small number of reasonable fairness conditions, does not apply to this mechanism. Arrow’s theorem governs ordinal systems in which voters can only rank alternatives. As Arrow himself later acknowledged, systems based on cardinal utilities, where voters express the strength of their preferences, are not subject to his impossibility result. Quadratic voting is a cardinal system. Buterin, Hitzig, and Weyl (2019) extended this mechanism into “quadratic funding” and proved that it yields optimal provision of public goods without requiring a centralized legislature to determine the optimal level (Management Science, Vol. 65, No. 11, pp. 5171–5187).

This has been tried in practice. The Colorado House Democratic Caucus used quadratic voting in 2019 to prioritize 107 bills. The city council of Gramado, Brazil used it to prioritize its legislative agenda, in a project organized by ITS Rio in partnership with RadicalxChange. Taiwan’s Presidential Hackathon has used quadratic voting since 2019, with citizens allocating 99 voice credits across competing proposals to select projects for the national policy agenda. Participatory budgeting more broadly, pioneered in Porto Alegre, Brazil in 1989, has been implemented in over 11,500 municipalities worldwide as of 2024. Porto Alegre’s system used tiered assemblies where citizens prioritized investment categories and elected delegates to a participatory budget council. Participation grew from fewer than 1,000 per year in 1990 to approximately 40,000 in 1999 (World Bank, Bhatnagar et al.), governing the allocation of roughly 20 percent of the municipal budget. Sewer and water connections rose from 75 percent to 98 percent of households between 1988 and 1997, and a World Bank study of 253 Brazilian municipalities found that those using participatory budgeting collected 39 percent more in local taxes.

Counting these votes on a decentralized system requires reliable infrastructure. Fortunately, there are already systems to transfer and store information digitally. The field of algorithmic mechanism design studies the construction of algorithms that resist manipulation by strategic agents. A centralized ledger with distributed storage would be one method. Courts would settle disputes in distribution. The quadratic voting mechanism is itself resistant to strategic manipulation: Weyl (2017) showed that the mechanism resists certain forms of collusion, fraud, and aggregate uncertainty, because the quadratic cost structure makes it expensive for any individual or group to dominate the outcome. This planning system would be part of the constitution; amending it would require a supermajority in a referendum.

If the government lacks the productive resources to meet these demands, and the people have voted for sufficient essential goods to justify it, the necessary means of production are expropriated from their current owners and assigned to workers. This is necessary collectivization, not total collectivization.

The purpose is to free workers from dependence on capitalists in specific, concrete ways. Capitalist employers can stop creating jobs when returns decline, stop selling essential goods when it is unprofitable, and move capital abroad to escape unfavorable conditions. Under this proposal, none of these exits are available. The economy keeps producing what the people vote for regardless of profitability.

  1. Accountable Planning

A centrally planned economy in the Soviet mold requires the central authority to determine not only what is produced but how it is produced and by whom. The Soviet Union assigned workers to jobs far from their families, and citizens who wished to change professions or relocate faced bureaucratic obstacles that many experienced as a form of coercion no less real than market compulsion.

Jane Jacobs documented in The Economy of Cities (1969) how a mining company transitioned into making sandpaper from its abrasive materials, and from there into adhesive tape. This happened through organic experimentation at the point of production. It’s the kind of transition that is difficult to anticipate from the center unless the planning agency’s reach is very small.

Under the current proposal, the plan is set from the bottom by popular vote, not from the top by a party bureau. The aggregated vote results become what economists call the final demand vector: a list specifying how much of each finished good the population wants produced for consumption, as opposed to intermediate goods (like steel or electricity) that are used up in making other products.

How production is organized locally (what techniques to use, how to divide tasks, what intermediate innovations to pursue) is left to workers and communities. The government’s role is the allocation of the means of production to industries by the will of the masses:

Are the demanded goods being produced?

Are workers being treated fairly?

Are resources being used responsibly?

This is accountable planning. The plan originates with the people, and the planners are accountable to them.

The empirical basis for this planning is the labor theory of value. Studies across multiple countries and decades have found strong correlations between labor values and market prices (see Part 1, “Labor Values Predict Market Prices,” for the full survey of evidence): Shaikh (1998) for the United States, Petrovic (1987) for Yugoslavia, Ochoa (1989) for the United States using different methods, Cockshott and Cottrell (1997) for the United Kingdom, and Zachariah (2006) for eighteen OECD countries. The reported R-squared values are consistently high, typically above 0.90, though the exact figures vary with the level of sectoral aggregation and the regression specification employed. (As with any cross-sectoral regression, higher levels of aggregation tend to produce higher R-squared values; the correlation remains strong but the specific magnitude depends on methodology.) The MELT (the Monetary Expression of Labour-time, explained in Part 1, “Why the Regularity Holds: Statistical Mechanics”) provides the bridge between labor-time accounting and monetary prices. The ratio is empirically stable and calculable from national input-output data. There is no need for the planners to guess at the relationship between labor and price. It can be measured.

Hayek said that an economy involves so much distributed information that no central authority could possibly aggregate it. The price system achieves this aggregation with remarkable economy. As Cockshott, Cottrell, Michaelson, Wright, and Yakovenko demonstrate in Classical Econophysics (Routledge, 2009, Chapter 15), it is quantitatively wrong.

The argument proceeds in two stages:

a) A comparison of the information that must flow through a market economy versus a planned economy.

b) A demonstration that the planning computation itself is fast enough to perform routinely.

To understand the information-flow comparison, consider what happens in a market economy when it adjusts toward equilibrium. Every firm must communicate with every supplier, requesting price quotes, reading them, calculating costs, placing orders, and processing deliveries. If an economy has n firms, each with on average m suppliers, and each message requires b bits to encode a price or quantity, then every iteration of this adjustment process requires approximately 4nm(b + 2) bits of communication: four types of message (price request, price quote, order, delivery note) multiplied across all firm-supplier pairs.

In a planned system, the planning bureau collects the technology matrix, a table recording, for each product in the economy, what inputs are needed to make one unit of it (so many tons of coal per ton of iron, so many hours of labor per ton of corn, and so on). This matrix is transmitted once. In the first iteration, at a communications cost comparable to one round of market price exchange. After that, the bureau already knows the production structure. Subsequent iterations require only updates on current stocks and delivery instructions, cutting the per-iteration communications load to roughly half the market’s.

The mathematically optimal trajectory from the economy’s current output structure to its target (Dorfman, Samuelson, and Solow, 1958) is called a turnpike path. As the planning bureau is able to compute this, it converges on the target faster than a market system, where each step of adjustment requires the physical movement of goods and the slow propagation of price signals through the real economy.

The term “turnpike” comes from the theorem’s central insight. Just as the fastest route between two nearby towns may involve getting on the highway (the turnpike) even though the towns are close, the fastest path between two economic configurations typically involves moving toward the maximum balanced-growth path and then departing from it near the end to hit the exact target.

Fundamentally, the computation at the heart of planning, deriving labor values and balanced production targets from an input-output table, is what mathematicians call a contractive affine transform (Barnsley, 1988). A contractive transform is one that, when applied repeatedly, brings its output closer and closer to a fixed point. The planning computation works this way because any viable economy produces a net surplus. When the bureau makes an initial estimate of how much of each input is needed and feeds that estimate back through the production table, any error in the estimate is spread over a larger quantity of output, so the percentage error shrinks with each pass. After enough passes, the estimates converge on a consistent set of production targets.

Cockshott and Cottrell demonstrate this with a worked example. An economy producing iron, coal, corn, and bread, where the planners start with a final demand of 20,000 tons of coal and 1,000 tons of bread. In the first pass they estimate the gross output needed; in each subsequent pass the estimates improve. By approximately the twentieth pass they converge on a consistent gross output vector (3,708 tons of iron, 34,896 tons of coal, 1,667 tons of corn, and 1,000 tons of bread). The computation is the same one used to calculate labor values from input-output tables (see Part 1, “Labor Values Predict Market Prices,” for the methodology using the Leontief inverse).

The algorithm was tested on model economies ranging from one thousand to one million products on a commodity personal computer circa 2004; even a continental-scale economy of ten million products, which Nove (1983) considered too large to plan, would require approximately an hour on a single 64-bit processor of 2006 vintage and could be parallelized on a cluster of networked PCs to under ten minutes. This is trivial by contemporary standards.

In accountable planning, the planning bureau takes the final demand vector set by the popular vote, feeds it into the input-output computation, and produces the balanced production targets that the government sector then executes.

What about the neoclassical objection that economic equilibrium is too complex to compute? Here two very different concepts of equilibrium must be distinguished. Neoclassical general equilibrium, the kind formalized by Arrow and Debreu, is a mechanical equilibrium, a unique point in the space of all possible economic configurations where every market clears simultaneously and no agent can improve their position. Two independent lines of research have shown that finding such an equilibrium is computationally intractable.

Deng and Huang (2006) proved that finding a market equilibrium that maximizes social welfare in a Leontief exchange economy is NP-hard (Information Processing Letters, Vol. 97, No. 1, pp. 4–11). A Leontief exchange economy is one in which each agent’s preferences are of a fixed-proportions type: the agent wants goods in specific ratios (one unit of bread requires exactly two units of butter, say) and derives no benefit from extra units of one good without corresponding units of the others. This is the simplest realistic model of production inputs, where components must be combined in fixed proportions, and it is the natural setting for studying the complexity of equilibrium computation. NP-hard is a term from computational complexity theory designating problems for which no polynomial-time algorithm is known. Finding one would imply P = NP, one of the deepest open problems in mathematics. The computational cost of NP-hard problems grows exponentially with the size of the input: a problem with n variables may require on the order of 2^n operations to solve, meaning that even modest increases in problem size cause the computation to explode beyond any practical capacity. What Deng and Huang showed is that even for economies guaranteed to have an equilibrium, selecting the best one (the one that maximizes total welfare) is a problem in this intractable class. Cockshott, Cottrell, Michaelson, Wright, and Yakovenko discuss this result in Classical Econophysics (Routledge, 2009, Chapter 15).

The broader problem of computing any market equilibrium at all, without the welfare-maximization requirement, falls into a different complexity class, PPAD (Polynomial Parity Arguments on Directed graphs). PPAD-completeness was established for computing Nash equilibria by Daskalakis, Goldberg, and Papadimitriou (2006), who proved it for games with three or more players, and extended to two-player games by Chen and Deng (2006). The connection to market equilibria in Leontief economies runs through the equivalence between Leontief exchange and two-player games demonstrated by Codenotti, Saberi, Varadarajan, and Ye (2006). PPAD-complete problems are believed to be intractable (no polynomial-time algorithm is known, and finding one would collapse the complexity class), but they differ from NP-hard problems in a specific way: PPAD guarantees that a solution exists (by a parity argument on a directed graph), so the difficulty lies not in determining whether a solution exists but in finding it. The practical implication is the same: even when an equilibrium is guaranteed to exist, no known algorithm can find it in time that grows polynomially with the size of the economy.

Both results support the same conclusion. However, this knife cuts both ways. If the problem is intractable, then no collection of millions of individuals interacting via the market can solve it either. For the NP-hard welfare-maximization problem, the cost grows exponentially with the number of economic actors. Computational resources grow linearly with n, but the cost of the computation grows as 2^n. For the PPAD-complete problem of finding any equilibrium at all, no polynomial-time algorithm is known, and the market has no structural advantage over a computer in searching for a solution whose existence is guaranteed but whose location is computationally elusive. Either way, the market cannot find its own neoclassical equilibrium any more than a planning computer can.

The neoclassical equilibrium is a mirage. No real economy, whether planned or market-driven, has ever operated at a point of Arrow-Debreu general equilibrium. No economy could, because the computation required to find such a point exceeds the computational capacity of the economy itself.

The economic equilibrium under discussion is statistical equilibrium. It’s not a single point where the economy sits motionless. Rather, a stable probability distribution over possible states, analogous to the way a gas in a container has a stable distribution of molecular velocities even though individual molecules are constantly bouncing around (see Part 1, “Why the Regularity Holds: Statistical Mechanics,” for the derivation from conservation laws). Individual firms and workers change their positions constantly, but the overall distribution, the shape of the income distribution, the dispersion of profit rates, the relationship between labor values and prices, remains stable. This equilibrium is computationally tractable for both markets and planners. Economic planning does not have to solve the impossible problem of neoclassical equilibrium. It has to apply the law of value more efficiently than the market does.

Hayek was also wrong about the sufficiency of prices as information carriers. Prices are a lossy compression of the economy’s structure. The full input-output table of an economy with n products contains n-squared entries. Prices compress this to a vector of n numbers. In information-theoretic terms, if we let H_I denote the entropy of interconnection encoded in the input-output table, the entropy of the price vector H_P grows only as the square root of H_I; that is, H_P is approximately equal to the square root of H_I (Cockshott et al., 2009, Section 15.1.1).

Entropy here is used in the information-theoretic sense established by Shannon, a measure of the amount of information contained in a data structure. Prices contain far less information than the production structure they are supposed to regulate. See Part 1, “Information Theory and Thermodynamics,” for the relationship between Shannon entropy and physical entropy.

The authors note that this treatment somewhat overestimates the true entropy of interconnection, but the fundamental point stands. The reduction in information is very substantial. Prices in themselves provide adequate knowledge for rational calculation only if they are at their long-run equilibrium levels, but for Hayek they never are. A firm that sees the price of tin rise cannot tell from the price alone whether the increase is temporary (a strike) or permanent (exhaustion of reserves). The rational response differs in the two cases. Hayek’s own trade cycle theory admits that disequilibrium prices cause malinvestment. Prices are not the only information channel in an economy. Actual orders for commodities, specified in quantities, carry information that prices do not. A firm that only watches prices and ignores order volumes will not survive long. A planning system that tracks both quantities and labor costs operates with more information, not less, than a system that relies on prices alone.

Ian Wright’s agent-based simulations (Review of Political Economy, 2008; developed further in Classical Econophysics, Chapter 9) provide theoretical support for the division of labor between center and periphery that this proposal adopts. In Wright’s models (described in Part 1, “Why the Regularity Holds: Statistical Mechanics”), when many agents trade subject to budget and production constraints, prices gravitate toward labor values without any agent calculating them. Deviations from labor values function as error signals that reallocate social labor across sectors. Accountable planning can exploit the same statistical regularities, setting the broad parameters (what to produce and in what quantities) while allowing local agents to find efficient production methods within those parameters.

  1. Preventing Corruption: A Divided Government

Over time, vanguard parties tend to transform into a labor aristocracy. As Milovan Djilas argued in The New Class (1957), party members stepped into the role of a ruling class, exercising collective political control over the means of production as a new form of monopoly ownership. Mikhail Voslensky documented the system in Nomenklatura: The Soviet Ruling Class (1984), estimating the core nomenklatura at roughly 750,000 top officials, and with their families at approximately three million people, less than 1.5% of a population of over two hundred million. This is structural. A party that holds a monopoly on political power has no mechanism by which the working class can hold it accountable.

The solution is not to install a trustworthy party. The solution is to structure the government so that no faction within it can coordinate against the people. The government is run by secretaries it has hired. The secretaries are required by law to poll the people on their demands and then enact their will. They are not members of one party. This fragmentation prevents opportunists from coordinating to subvert the government’s mandate. If the secretaries fail to follow the law, they are fired.

This government is divided within itself, divided in its interests, its personnel, its institutional loyalties, so that it cannot conspire against the people. The state must be weak so that the masses can be powerful.

  1. Labor Vouchers and the Price Mechanism

Government workers are paid in labor vouchers. The critical distinction between labor vouchers and money is that labor vouchers do not circulate. As Marx argued in the Critique of the Gotha Programme (1875), a worker receives from society a certificate of the labor contributed, and with that certificate withdraws from the social stock of consumer goods a quantity whose production cost the same amount of labor.

The voucher records an individual’s contribution to a social process and is cancelled upon use. It cannot be lent, invested, or accumulated. This eliminates the possibility of capital accumulation through the voucher system.

Under capitalism, money circulates. It passes from buyer to seller and the seller spends it again, enabling the accumulation circuit M–C–M’, described in Part 1. Labor vouchers break this circuit by design: they are issued for work, exchanged once for goods, and then destroyed.

The non-circulation principle applies to consumer labor vouchers, the tokens issued to individual workers and redeemed at public stores. The inter-enterprise accounting described in Section 6 below, in which labor-time costs are debited and credited between production units, is a different mechanism. Entries in a common ledger that track the flow of embodied labor through the production process, not the circulation of tokens between holders. The distinction is between labor-time as a unit of account (used in enterprise-level planning) and labor vouchers as a medium of individual remuneration (issued to workers and cancelled upon redemption). The former is an accounting identity; the latter is a non-transferable certificate. The two operate in different registers.

The real purchasing power of labor vouchers depends on the quantity of goods available for sale, not the denomination of the vouchers themselves. This proposal decrees neither fixed salaries nor fixed prices. It decrees increased production and sale of the goods that voters demand. If supply increases, prices naturally fall.

A sustained, economy-wide decline in prices is called deflation. At first glance, falling prices sound like a good thing, the same money buys more. But under capitalism, deflation is catastrophic, and understanding why is essential to understanding how this proposal differs.

In a capitalist economy, nearly all production is financed by borrowing. A firm takes out a loan to buy equipment, hires workers, produces goods, sells them, and repays the loan with interest out of the revenue. The loan is denominated in nominal terms. If a firm borrows $100,000, it owes $100,000 plus interest regardless of what happens to prices. When prices fall, the firm’s revenue declines (it sells the same goods for less money), but the debt stays the same. The real burden of debt, the amount of actual goods and labor required to repay it increases.

The economist Irving Fisher formalized this in 1933 as the debt-deflation theory. When indebted firms and households find their revenues falling while their debts remain fixed, they are forced to sell assets to meet their obligations. But mass selling drives asset prices down further, which increases the real debt burden further, which forces more selling. The result is a self-reinforcing spiral. Falling prices cause insolvency, insolvency causes distress selling, distress selling causes further price declines. Fisher developed the theory to explain the Great Depression, during which this spiral drove mass bankruptcy, unemployment, and a contraction in output that persisted until government intervention broke the cycle.

There is a second mechanism. When consumers expect prices to keep falling, they delay purchases. Why buy today what will be cheaper tomorrow? This individually rational behavior collectively reduces demand, which pushes prices down further, which reinforces the expectation of future declines. Businesses, facing declining sales and rising real debt burdens, cut wages, lay off workers, and halt investment. Production shuts down precisely when people most need it to continue. Japan’s experience from the 1990s onward illustrates the pattern. After an asset bubble burst in 1991, the economy entered a prolonged deflationary period in which nominal GDP in 2001 was approximately what it had been in 1995, real wages fell, and businesses hoarded cash rather than investing, preferring the guaranteed real return of holding money whose purchasing power was rising. The stagnation lasted, by some measures, three decades.

Inflation is the mirror-image. When the money supply expands faster than the real output of the economy, or when production costs rise across sectors simultaneously, prices rise. The mechanisms are multiple and reinforcing. Cost-push inflation occurs when the price of a key input (energy, raw materials, labor) rises, and producers pass the increase through to final prices, which in turn raises the cost of living, which generates pressure for wage increases, which raises costs further. Demand-pull inflation occurs when aggregate spending exceeds the economy’s productive capacity. Too much money chasing too few goods.

Monetary inflation occurs when the money supply expands through credit creation or central bank intervention without a corresponding expansion in real output, diluting the purchasing power of existing money (see Part 1, “Money Creation as Redistribution,” for the conservation-law analysis of this process). In practice, all three mechanisms operate simultaneously and interact. The stagflation of the 1970s, in which high inflation coincided with stagnant output and rising unemployment, demonstrated that cost-push and monetary factors can produce sustained price increases even in the absence of excess demand, confounding the simple Phillips curve trade-off between inflation and unemployment that had guided postwar policy.

The effect on workers is a real pay cut. Nominal wages may rise, but if they rise more slowly than prices, the worker commands less real output per hour worked. The effect on debtors is the opposite of deflation. The real burden of fixed-rate debt falls, because the debt is repaid in money whose purchasing power has declined. This is why moderate inflation benefits borrowers (including the government, which is typically the largest debtor) at the expense of savers and creditors, and why deflation benefits creditors at the expense of borrowers. The asymmetry between who benefits and who loses under each scenario is a distributional question, hence the political character of monetary policy.

Capitalist economies have developed an extensive institutional apparatus to prevent deflation. Since the 1990s, most major central banks have adopted explicit inflation targets, typically around 2 percent per year. The target is set above zero precisely to maintain a buffer against deflation. If inflation is already at 2 percent and the economy enters a downturn, the central bank can cut interest rates to stimulate borrowing and spending, tolerating a temporary decline toward zero inflation without entering deflationary territory. The 2 percent figure was first adopted by New Zealand’s Reserve Bank in 1990 and subsequently became the standard for the Bank of England, the European Central Bank, and (officially, from 2012) the US Federal Reserve.

In normal times, the central bank lowers short-term interest rates to make borrowing cheaper, encouraging firms to invest and consumers to spend rather than save. When interest rates hit zero and deflation still threatens (the situation Fisher feared and Japan experienced) central banks resort to unconventional measures. Quantitative easing (large-scale purchases of government bonds and other assets to inject money into the financial system), forward guidance (public commitments to keep rates low for extended periods), and in some cases negative interest rates on bank reserves.

The entire apparatus exists because deflation, under capitalism, means the M–C–M’ circuit breaks down. A capitalist invests money (M) to produce a commodity (C) and sell it for more money (M’), but prices fall so that M’ is less than M, the circuit yields a loss. The rational response is to stop investing. Hold money instead, since its purchasing power is rising. When enough capitalists make this individually rational choice, production halts, workers are laid off, and output collapses.

The standard policy responses are inflation targeting, interest rate manipulation, quantitative easing, etc. These are attempts to prevent prices from falling in the first place, so that the M–C–M’ circuit remains profitable and production continues. But this means that under capitalism, continued production depends on the maintenance of a positive inflation rate. Goods must keep getting slightly more expensive, year after year, so that the returns on investment remain positive and firms keep producing. The system requires that the purchasing power of money be deliberately eroded as a condition of its own stability. (The redistributive consequences of these monetary interventions. The fact that quantitative easing inflates asset prices and benefits asset-holders at the expense of wage-earners, are discussed in Part 1, “Money Creation as Redistribution.”)

This creates a political contradiction that capitalist democracies have never resolved. Voters hate inflation. They experience it not as an abstract macroeconomic variable but as a concrete decline in their standard of living. The same paycheck buys less food, less housing, less medicine. Polling consistently shows that rising prices rank among voters’ top concerns, often above unemployment, and incumbents who preside over inflation are punished at the ballot box regardless of whether the inflation was caused by their policies.

For workers whose wages do not keep pace with prices, inflation is a real pay cut delivered invisibly, without any employer announcing it. But the system cannot function without it. Central banks target 2 percent inflation not because voters want prices to rise 2 percent per year but because the alternative, stable or falling prices, would break the profit-seeking circuit that keeps capitalist production going. The result is that the institutional apparatus of capitalism is structurally committed to making voters’ money worth less every year, and voters are structurally committed to resenting it.

When inflation spikes above the gentle 2 percent background rate, as it did in the 1970s, and again in the early 2020s, the resentment intensifies. The psychology of what happens next is well studied.

Terror Management Theory, developed by Greenberg, Pyszczynski, and Solomon (1986) from the work of cultural anthropologist Ernest Becker (The Denial of Death, 1973), proposes that human beings manage the existential terror of mortality by investing in cultural worldviews that give life meaning and in self-esteem that makes them feel like valued participants in that meaningful world. When these psychological structures are threatened, people respond by clinging more intensely to whatever promises to restore a sense of order, significance, and protection. The experimental evidence is extensive. In the standard paradigm, participants who are asked to think about their own death (a manipulation called “mortality salience”) subsequently show intensified defense of their cultural worldview. Harsher judgments of those who violate cultural norms, more positive evaluations of those who uphold them, increased prejudice against outgroups, and increased aggression toward those perceived as threatening. A meta-analysis of 277 experiments across 164 articles found moderate and consistent effects (Burke, Martens, and Faucher, 2010).

Critically for politics, Cohen, Solomon, Maxfield, Pyszczynski, and Greenberg (2004) found that mortality salience specifically increased support for charismatic leaders, those who articulate a bold, emotionally compelling vision of collective greatness, over both task-oriented leaders (who emphasize pragmatic planning) and relationship-oriented leaders (who emphasize compassion and trust). The same research group found that mortality salience shifted support toward George W. Bush and away from John Kerry in the 2004 presidential election (Landau, Solomon, Greenberg, et al., 2004). A subsequent study found that mortality salience increased Americans’ support for Donald Trump (Cohen, Solomon, et al., 2017). A meta-analysis specifically examining mortality salience effects on political attitudes (Burke, Kosloff, and Landau, 2013) found support for both a “worldview defense” effect (people cling harder to their existing ideology) and a “conservative shift” effect (people move toward authoritarian and system-justifying positions regardless of their prior ideology), with the worldview-defense effect somewhat stronger overall.

Economic insecurity functions as an existential threat in the same register as mortality. When a worker’s purchasing power declines and they cannot provide for their family at the standard they expected, the cultural worldview that gave their life meaning is destabilized. The self-esteem derived from being a competent provider is undermined. The resulting anxiety activates the same defensive responses that mortality salience produces in the laboratory: intensified in-group loyalty, hostility toward perceived outsiders. Above all a hunger for charismatic leaders who promise to restore the threatened worldview by force of will. Demagogues do not need to understand TMT to exploit it. They need only to name the threat (immigrants, foreign competition, elite corruption), promise decisive action, and project the kind of bold, unyielding confidence that mortality-salient individuals find irresistible. The pattern is visible in the stagflation of the 1970s, which powered the rise of Thatcher and Reagan; in the post-2008 austerity period, which fueled nationalist movements across Europe; and in the inflation spike of the early 2020s, which provided political fuel for authoritarian populism in multiple democracies simultaneously.

If capitalism structurally requires inflation, and inflation structurally produces a specific kind of political vulnerability, then the political instability of capitalist democracies is not a contingent failure of leadership. It’s a predictable consequence of the system’s own operating requirements. The inflation that the system needs to survive is the same inflation that erodes public trust in the system’s legitimacy. Capitalism does not just produce economic instability. It produces the precise form of existential anxiety that makes democratic populations vulnerable to the leaders least likely to govern in their interest.

There is no M–C–M’ circuit under accountable planning. Production is not financed by debt and does not need to generate a monetary return. It is driven by popular demand and funded by the direct allocation of labor and resources. When prices fall because goods are abundant, no debt spiral is triggered as the government sector does not borrow to produce. No firm faces insolvency from declining revenue, because there is no revenue target to meet. Workers are not laid off when prices fall because their employment depends on the democratic mandate. Deflation does not trigger deferred consumption because the goods are already being produced in the quantities the population voted for. The purchasing power of labor vouchers rises as goods become abundant. The standard of living rises with all of this.

Because workers’ purchasing power rises rather than erodes, the existential anxiety that drives populations toward authoritarian leaders is defused.

  1. Coordination of Intermediate Production

Multiple projects that require the same intermediate products should pool resources. For example, all construction projects requiring steel bars in a region could collectively support a dedicated facility that produces high-quality steel and delivers it to its supporters. A housing development, a bridge repair, and a hospital expansion all need structural steel. Rather than each project independently negotiating with suppliers or attempting to produce its own steel, they contribute a portion of their labor budgets to a shared steelworks. The steelworks specializes, achieves economies of scale, and delivers to all its supporters at cost denominated in labor time.

This is voluntary coordination among producers. If a project finds a better supplier or a more efficient method, it is free to redirect its support. The steelworks that loses supporters must improve or close.

The accounting mechanism is labor-time cost. When the steelworks delivers steel to a construction project, the labor content of that steel (direct labor at the steelworks plus the indirect labor embodied in the raw materials it consumed) is debited from the construction project’s labor budget and credited to the steelworks. There is no profit margin. The cost of intermediate goods reflects only the labor required to produce them. This is the same quantity that Cockshott and Cottrell’s methodology computes when calculating the Leontief inverse (see Part 1, “Labor Values Predict Market Prices,” for the methodology). The same quantity that empirically predicts market prices. As noted in Section 5, these debits and credits are a mechanism for tracking embodied labor through the production chain, not the circulation of labor vouchers between holders.

This structure also provides a natural mechanism for identifying inefficiency. If one facility’s labor costs per unit are higher than those of a comparable facility, the projects it serves have a direct incentive to switch. The consumers of intermediate goods perform this function automatically, because they are working within fixed labor budgets.

  1. Assignment of the Means of Production

Let’s say a group of applicants want farming jobs. They are assigned land by the government. Their work is subsidized as long as the people vote for agricultural production. If they mismanage the land, it is reassigned to other applicants.

If there is persistent failure to produce, damage to the land or failure to deliver agreed-upon outputs, they are accused of mismanagement. Accusations are resolved through legal challenges with reasonable evidential standards. General legal guidelines define what counts as mismanagement.

This is a legal process, not an administrative one. The aim is to prevent both the arbitrary seizure of productive land and the indefinite occupation of land by those who fail to use it.

This system provides a permanent alternative to wage labor. Anyone willing to farm can apply for land and receive government support. This proposal removes the means of production from the commodity circuit.

  1. The Capitalist Remainder

This proposal does not seek to ban competition or market exchange. The problem is not competition or individual initiative. It’s the profit motive and its associated ills: the instability caused by the business cycle, the falling rate of profit, the distortion of demand by purchasing power, and the concentration of ownership that these forces produce. Just as a minimal market existed before capitalism, a minimal market will exist after capitalism.

Every economy that has attempted to abolish market exchange entirely has generated an informal sector. Gregory Grossman coined the term “second economy” for the Soviet Union’s informal sector. In a 1977 article in Problems of Communism, he defined it as all economic activity conducted for direct private gain or in knowing contravention of existing law. The Berkeley-Duke emigre household budget survey estimated that approximately 28 to 33 percent of urban household income in the late 1970s derived from second-economy activity (Grossman, 1987, using data from the survey administered to 1,061 emigre households).

Society is too divided for total collectivization. It is better strategy to target the principal actors than to criminalize every person who participates in exchange. Collectivization should be carried out, but as necessary. It should not try to encompass the whole economy.

The government does not concern itself with private producers unless they obstruct the fulfillment of popular demand. Private businesses may exist. The labor voucher system is the sole unit of account in the government sector and operates independently of whatever medium of exchange the remaining private sector adopts. Within the government sector there is no “currency” in the conventional sense, because labor vouchers do not circulate. They are issued for work performed and cancelled upon redemption. The private sector may use whatever medium of exchange it develops, but this has no standing within the government system.

Taking means of production from private owners is triggered by one of two conditions:

a) The people have voted for goods whose production requires means currently in private hands and those goods cannot otherwise be supplied.

b) A private owner has accumulated productive assets beyond the threshold at which continued accumulation threatens democratic governance.

The first trigger (unmet popular demand) ensures that private ownership cannot block essential production. The second (asset-accumulation threshold) ensures that no private actor amasses enough economic power to mount a serious political challenge. Under this proposal, businesses are explicitly told that if their growth becomes too large, the means of production will be seized. Without the hope of potentially infinite growth, these mechanisms ensure that the businesses surviving under these conditions are marginal to the economy.

When either condition is triggered, the confiscation is an administrative and legal process analogous to eminent domain or a regulatory fine, not a criminal sanction. It is carried out by authorized agents of the government acting under legal authority.

“Cannot otherwise be supplied” has an operational definition like: the people have voted for a good, the government has issued production contracts or subsidized production in the relevant sector, a statutory period has elapsed and the quantity produced still falls below the target by a specified margin. The determination is made by a court on the basis of publicly auditable production data.

Private-sector capacity can be assessed through the same input-output data the proposal already relies on for labor-value calculations. If Cockshott and Cottrell’s methods can compute labor values from national input-output tables, the same tables reveal sectoral output and capacity. The measurement problem is real but not different in kind from the measurement problems the proposal already accepts as tractable.

Since collectivization is not total, some M–C–M’ remains in the economy. Even if marginal, speculation does extract positive surplus value. If private producers are operating for profit using wage labor, then value relations persist in that sector, and the labor provided there has the character of wages; it is indirectly social.

“Indirectly social” means that the labor is validated as socially useful only after the fact, through the sale of the commodity on the market. If the product does not sell, the labor was wasted. It never becomes part of the social total. By contrast, labor in the government sector is “directly social”. It is recognized as socially useful at the point of production, as the production plan itself was set by popular vote. The distinction matters because Marx argued that labor vouchers presuppose directly social labor (see Section 2 of Part 4).

The capitalist remainder is a genuine remnant of the old mode of production, operating with money, wages, profits, and indirectly social labor. However, it is under total control of a democratic authority that can prune it as necessary.

The factor that keeps workers trapped in exploitative jobs under capitalism is the coercive structure of the labor market. Workers must sell their labor-power to whoever will buy it because the alternative is destitution. The government sector provides a permanent exit from that dependency. Capitalists who remain in operation must offer conditions attractive enough to compete with the government sector, or they will have no workers. This breaks the power of private employers and inverts the power relation that prevails under capitalism.

Materialist Economics, Part 2: The Problem

Consider a recurring pattern in international affairs. A major power backs an armed faction abroad. When that faction takes power, its human rights record becomes a pretext for military contracts and arms sales. The crisis generates jobs in the defense industry while destroying livelihoods elsewhere. This is job creation through destruction.

A simple alternative would be to create jobs by vote.

The usual answer is that economies are too complex for popular direction. Markets, the argument goes, process information that no central authority can aggregate. The history of centrally planned economies gives this objection real force. But the choice is not limited to laissez-faire capitalism or Soviet-style central planning. There is a third possibility: an economy that is planned accountably, with the plan set by popular vote rather than by a party bureau. Production can be organized locally rather than directed from the center.

This series describes that third possibility. It draws on a body of empirical research spanning decades and dozens of countries, showing that the amount of labor required to produce a commodity predicts its market price with remarkable accuracy (see “Labor Values Predict Market Prices,” Part 1, for the full evidence). If economic regularities are this measurable, then democratic planning of production is not a utopian fantasy. It is an engineering problem. Recent work in econophysics and information theory demonstrates that the computation required for economic planning is not only tractable but involves less information transmission than the market system it replaces. This essay lays out the problem with capitalism. The empirical and theoretical foundations on which the alternative rests were presented in Part 1. Part 3 presents the proposal. Part 4 addresses objections. Part 5 concludes.

The profit motive produces interlocking dynamics that make capitalism structurally unstable. Businesses are most profitable when they suppress wages relative to productivity, but when wages are systematically suppressed, workers cannot afford to buy back what they produce. The resulting imbalance between productive capacity and purchasing power pushes prices downward.

When prices fall, a process economists call deflation, businesses cannot extract enough surplus to justify production. Investors hold their money rather than deploying it, and the resulting contraction leads to scarcity. When the money supply increases instead, businesses gather more of it, giving them the appearance of profitability without the pressure to perform socially beneficial work, and inequality rises. Inflation erodes the purchasing power of most workers even as it gives surviving firms the appearance of profitability. Neither deflation nor inflation resolves the underlying imbalance; each simply shifts the damage.

A capitalist economy has no stable state. When it doesn’t grow, it shrinks. Section 5 of Part 3 explains the mechanics of both in detail and shows how this proposal eliminates the trap.

Capitalist growth is fueled by incorporating new markets: new populations willing to work more cheaply, new territories whose resources can be extracted, new consumer sectors opened up by technology. Rosa Luxemburg argued in The Accumulation of Capital (1913) that capitalism requires access to non-capitalist markets to realize surplus value, and that this necessity drives imperialist conquest as advanced capitalist states absorb pre-capitalist regions. The globe is now substantially out of large non-capitalist population centers to incorporate. For continued growth, one must assume that technology will generate demand that people are both willing and able to pay for (that AI-driven job displacement will not be serious) and that environmental constraints will not materially affect market-linked assets. Both assumptions are precarious.

There is also a subtler distortion. What counts as “demand” under capitalism is not demand expressed by human beings but demand expressed by purchasing power. A spender matters to the market in proportion to the capital they can mobilize, and this has nothing to do with social benefit. Production skews toward the interests of the wealthy. This leads to an artificial scarcity of basic necessities, because it is less profitable to produce goods for people who command less purchasing power. This is not an incidental flaw that better regulation could correct. It is a structural feature of any system in which the means of production are deployed for profit rather than for use. The proposal is to redirect production toward what the population actually needs. The question is whether there exists a scientific basis for this redirection. Part 1 presented the case that there does.

The theoretical framework for this proposal is mechanical materialism, the philosophical system described in Part 1 of this series. Because labor values predict market prices with high accuracy across countries and decades (see “Labor Values Predict Market Prices,” Part 1), democratic planning of production has a measurable basis. Because the two-class structure of capitalism is a statistical regularity governed by conservation laws rather than a contingent historical accident (see “The Class Structure as Statistical Regularity,” Part 1), it will not yield to piecemeal reform. Changing it requires altering the underlying relations of production. Because contemporary money creation redistributes existing claims on real output rather than generating new value (see “Money Creation as Redistribution,” Part 1), the financial system reinforces the class divide rather than bridging it. And because the rate of profit tends to fall over the long run (see “The Falling Rate of Profit,” Part 1), capitalism periodically destroys productive capacity while human needs go unmet. Part 3 presents a proposal for what to do about it.

Materialist Economics, Part 1: Mechanical Materialism

The theoretical framework behind this proposal is mechanical materialism, a philosophical system argued for by the economist Paul Cockshott and the philosopher Katerina Kolozova. It seeks to extend the Newtonian approach to science to sociology, unifying both under a combined framework that employs conservation laws, statistical mechanics, and information theory. Researchers associated with this program have compiled long-run profit rate datasets reaching back to 1870, conducted input-output studies in over forty countries, and developed econophysics models of money distribution.

Kolozova draws on François Laruelle’s “non-philosophy” to argue that dialectics should be understood as a method of argumentation in its original Greek sense rather than as an ontological principle about the structure of reality. This position, developed in Toward a Radical Metaphysics of Socialism (Punctum Books, 2015), performs what Kolozova calls a “non-Marxist reading of Marx” to recover his descriptive language about economic processes. Defending Materialism (Bloomsbury Academic, 2024), by Kolozova, Cockshott, and Michaelson, connects Marx to the history of scientific materialism encompassing mechanics, information theory, Turing computation, and Boltzmann statistical mechanics.

Cockshott’s “Newtonian Marx” thesis draws a direct structural parallel between Capital and the Principia. The foundational law of Capital, on this reading, is a conservation law: in the exchange of commodities, abstract socially necessary labor time is conserved. This parallels conservation of momentum or energy in Newtonian mechanics. Just as Newton defines mass as the measure of undifferentiated matter, Marx defines a corresponding social quantity, undifferentiated abstract labor time. The law of surplus value then functions as a universal law of motion whose operations Marx tracks through profit, interest, and rent, analogous to Newton tracking gravitational force through planetary orbits.

Marx observes that commodity exchange is an equivalence relation: it is reflexive, symmetric, and transitive. If twenty yards of linen exchange for one coat, and one coat exchanges for ten pounds of tea, then twenty yards of linen exchange for ten pounds of tea. Marx states transitivity implicitly through the structure of what he calls “Form B” (the Expanded Form of Value), where one commodity’s value is expressed in a series of others. The transitive closure of these equivalences is what drives the transition to “Form C” (the General Form). Marx establishes symmetry in a subsequent passage and treats reflexivity as too obvious to require statement. From this observed equivalence relation, Marx deduces that there must be some abstract third thing conserved in the exchange, some substance, value, of which both sides contain the same quantity. Cockshott argues that this deduction is structurally identical to Newton’s deduction of the conservation of momentum from the observed behavior of colliding pendulums, an equivalence relation between physical states indicates a conservation process.

Conservation of energy was formalized by Mayer (1842), Joule (1843–1845), and Helmholtz (1847). Marx was writing Capital in the 1860s. The structural homology is striking. Value, like energy, appears in various forms (commodity, money, capital) while its substance, abstract labor time, is conserved in exchange. Marx’s distinction between labor and labor-power parallels Watt’s distinction between work and power so closely that, as Cockshott observes, it would have been immediately comprehensible to any Victorian reader familiar with steam engineering. The profit-generating circuit M → C → M′ (money → commodity → more money) then becomes a symmetry-breaking problem. If value is conserved in exchange, surplus value cannot arise from exchange itself but must be explained by the production process, where the commodity labor-power creates more value than it costs.

This reading is controversial. Marx’s own letters show he sided with Hegel’s low opinion of Newton, preferring Kepler. His references to Newton in Capital are peripheral (a footnote analogy in Volume I, Chapter 1, comparing the difficulty of analyzing economic forms to the analysis of physical bodies) and nowhere does he draw the systematic structural parallel that Cockshott proposes. Defending Materialism is frank about the tension, acknowledging that Marx’s dialectical presentation was “a shortcut” that “lacked the modern standards of scientific rigor, relying on dialectical sleight of hand.” Marx’s argument works because he stood on the shoulders of predecessors, Smith and Ricardo, whose observational work had already established the connection between labor content and price. What matters, on this account, is the structural parallel, conservation laws generating laws of motion, which connects Marx’s political economy directly to the econophysics research program and its empirical results, whether or not Marx himself would have accepted the connection.

Why Not Dialectics

Neither Marx nor Engels ever used the exact phrase “dialectical materialism.” Engels used “materialist dialectic” (materialistische Dialektik) in Anti-Dühring (1878) and Ludwig Feuerbach (1886), a related but, as Tony Burns notes, “not quite the same” formulation. The term was coined by the self-educated German tanner Joseph Dietzgen in his 1887 essay “Excursions of a Socialist into the Domain of Epistemology.” Georgi Plekhanov popularized it from 1891, and Stalin’s 1938 Short Course codified diamat as Soviet state philosophy. Engels’s Dialectics of Nature (unpublished in his lifetime, assembled from notes dating to 1873–86) identified three supposedly universal laws: the transformation of quantity into quality, the interpenetration of opposites, and the negation of the negation, all governing nature, society, and thought alike.

The critique of dialectics has a long history within Marxism. Lukács (1923) argued that dialectics involves a subject-object relation absent in nature, implying Engels’s extension of dialectical laws to natural processes was illegitimate. Sidney Hook (1933) argued that the apparently mysterious character of the Marxian dialectic is due to nothing more than its Hegelian terminology. Lucio Colletti (1969) drew on Kant’s concept of Realopposition to argue that Marx’s social analysis deals with real oppositions (class conflict, capital versus labor) not dialectical contradictions. Since dialectical contradiction violates the principle of non-contradiction, Colletti concluded that insofar as Marxism relies on it, Marxism cannot be considered a science. His teacher Galvano Della Volpe had anticipated this in Logic as a Positive Science (1950), arguing Marx’s method follows a Concrete-Abstract-Concrete scientific circle, like Galileo’s, not Hegel’s speculative descent from Abstract to Concrete.

The Analytical Marxists of the 1980s rejected dialectics wholesale, with Jon Elster arguing in Making Sense of Marx (1985) that Marx’s explanatory apparatus should be rebuilt on methodological individualist foundations, replacing functional explanation with game theory and the logic of collective action, and treating dialectics as an obstacle to clarity rather than a source of insight.

Althusser (1962) attempted to replace Hegel’s “simple contradiction” with “overdetermination,” a model of multiple contradictions each with its own temporality and relative autonomy. Thomas Nail’s Marx in Motion (Oxford University Press, 2020) offered an anti-dialectical reading from another direction, arguing that Marx’s deepest materialism is Epicurean and kinetic rather than dialectical. As Kołakowski summarized, the laws of dialectics consist partly of truisms, partly of philosophical dogmas, partly of nonsense, and partly of statements that could be any of these depending on interpretation.

When Stalin elaborates what “contradictions inherent in all things” means (that things develop and die, that social forms replace one another) he uses not dialectics but what Marx called the materialist theory of history. That quantitative change leads to qualitative change is, in physics, the phenomenon of phase transitions, such as water boiling into steam at 100°C at standard atmospheric pressure. This is describable in terms of discontinuities in the entropy function without the ambiguous terminology of “quantity” and “quality.” The dialectical vocabulary adds nothing to what mechanics and thermodynamics already provide, while introducing persistent opportunities for confusion between metaphorical and literal contradiction.

The positive case for mechanical materialism rests on the distinction between contradictions and laws of transformation. A dialectical materialist holds that contradictions are objective features of material reality resolvable only through material transformation. A mechanical materialist holds that what matters are not contradictions but regularities governing how systems change states under specified conditions. The distinction determines whether economics is to be practiced as a deductive philosophy, deriving conclusions from dialectical first principles, or as a physical science, deriving testable predictions from conservation constraints and statistical mechanics. The econophysics program takes the latter path.

Information Theory and Thermodynamics

If the conservation-law reading of Capital is to be more than a structural analogy, it requires a bridge between the mathematics of physics and the mathematics of economics. That bridge is the identity between thermodynamic entropy and information entropy.

The mathematical relationship between Shannon entropy (H = −Σ pᵢ log₂ pᵢ, measured in bits) and Boltzmann-Gibbs entropy (S = −k_B Σ pᵢ ln pᵢ, measured in joules per kelvin) is not an analogy. They share the same form. Both are the negative expected value of the logarithm of a probability distribution. The two expressions differ by a change of logarithmic base and a dimensional constant. Since ln x = log₂ x · ln 2, Shannon’s formula can be rewritten as H = −(1/ln 2) Σ pᵢ ln pᵢ, and the Boltzmann-Gibbs formula becomes S = k_B · ln 2 · H. The entire difference reduces to the factor k_B · ln 2, which converts between the information-theoretic unit (the bit) and the thermodynamic unit (joules per kelvin). This is a consequence of the fact that both quantities measure the same underlying thing. The logarithmic measure of the number of microstates compatible with a given macrostate. Rolf Landauer’s 1961 IBM paper established the physical bridge: erasing one bit of information requires minimum energy dissipation of k_B · T · ln(2), approximately 0.018 eV at room temperature. This was experimentally verified in 2012 by Bérut et al. in Nature (483, 187–189), who measured the heat dissipated when erasing a single bit stored in a colloidal particle in an optical trap, confirming saturation at the Landauer bound. Subsequent experiments extended verification to nanomagnetic bits (Hong et al., 2016) and quantum molecular magnets (Gaudenzi et al., 2018). Landauer’s principle follows from the second law of thermodynamics, making it a consequence of fundamental physics. E.T. Jaynes’s 1957 Physical Review papers reframed statistical mechanics as maximum entropy inference. The Boltzmann distribution emerges from maximizing Shannon entropy subject to a constraint on average energy.

The philosophical implication is that information is physical, not Platonic. It requires material substrates, has measurable thermodynamic costs. Its capacity in any region of space is bounded by physical quantities, the Bekenstein bound S ≤ 2πk_BRE/ℏc, where R is the radius of an enclosing sphere, E is total mass-energy, ℏ is the reduced Planck constant, and c is the speed of light. Entropy is an objective property of physical systems. Stars explode and increase entropy regardless of whether anyone observes them. Information encoded in DNA exists independently of any human subjective involvement. It is not information because a person can read it. A person can read it because it is information. Through this connection, Cockshott, Cottrell, Michaelson, Wright, and Yakovenko argue in Classical Econophysics (Routledge, 2009) that productive labor involves objective physical processes of entropy reduction requiring information, a physical entity. Human labor modifies the world by imposing low-entropy order on high-entropy raw materials, guided by information encoded in skills, blueprints, and action programs. This situates economics within thermodynamics and information theory from the ground up. It explains why the same maximum entropy formalism that governs molecular systems can be applied to economic ones.

Labor Values Predict Market Prices

With the theoretical framework in place, the empirical question becomes: If abstract labor time is the substance conserved in commodity exchange, then do labor values predict market prices?

Input-output studies comparing computed labor values to observed market prices have been replicated across many countries since the 1980s. The methodology computes the total direct and indirect labor required per unit of output using the Leontief inverse of national input-output tables, then correlates these against actual market prices. Cockshott and Cottrell (1997, Cambridge Journal of Economics) found a correlation of r = 0.977 across UK industrial sectors and tested labor against alternative “value bases,” including oil (r = 0.799), electricity (r = 0.826), and iron/steel (r = 0.576), demonstrating that labor’s predictive superiority is not an artifact of scale. The coefficient of variation of price-to-value ratios was just 0.198 for labor, versus 3.69–11.41 for the alternatives. An earlier study by Cockshott, Cottrell, and Michaelson (1995, Capital and Class) found r = 0.98 using 1984 UK data, dropping to r = 0.96 after correcting for inter-industry wage differentials.

Shaikh’s foundational analysis of the US economy (in Bellofiore (ed.), Marxian Economics: A Reappraisal, Macmillan, 1998), using data from Ochoa’s seventy-one-sector input-output model (PhD dissertation, New School for Social Research, 1984), reported mean absolute weighted deviations (MAWD) of just 9.2% between labor values and market prices. Ochoa’s own 1989 Cambridge Journal of Economics paper found 12–14% MAWD across multiple postwar years. Similar results have been found in Yugoslavia (Petrović, 1987), Greece (Tsoulfidis and Maniatis, 2002), Japan (Tsoulfidis, 2008), eighteen OECD countries (Zachariah, 2006), and Germany (Fröhlich, 2013). Most comprehensively, Işıkara and Mokre (2022, Review of Political Economy) analyzed forty-two countries over the period 2000–2017 using the World Input-Output Database, finding only small and stable deviations across more than 36,000 price vectors, the largest empirical application of its kind. Deviations between market prices and labor values fell in the range of 10–20 percent across nearly all countries in the sample.

Objections to these correlations have been addressed. Andrew Kliman’s 2002 Cambridge Journal of Economics critique argued the correlations are spurious, driven by industry size rather than any genuine price-value relationship. Nitzan and Bichler (2009) raised a related circularity objection: studies use monetary wage bills as proxies for labor, hence “correlate prices with prices.” Cockshott, Cottrell, and Valle Baeza responded in a 2014 Investigación Económica paper with three rebuttals. First, the alternative value bases test already refutes the scale artifact. If industry size drove correlations, oil and electricity should perform comparably to labor, but they do not. Second, Valle Baeza (2010) demonstrated that the proposed “per-unit” correction violates dimensional analysis, because one cannot meaningfully average the price of a barrel of oil with the price of a pencil across different physical units. Third, they proved mathematically that labor values calculated from monetary input-output tables are invariant (up to a scalar) to the price vector used, eliminating the circularity problem. Zachariah’s studies using Swedish input-output data with actual labor hours (person-years, not wage-bill proxies) confirmed results consistent with all other studies, directly addressing the circularity objection.

Vaona (2014) found weaker support using panel data methods across ten OECD countries. Mainstream economists observe that strong labor-price correlations are also consistent with simple cost-markup pricing theories, since labor is the largest cost component in most industries. Nevertheless, labor time remains an exceptionally strong predictor of relative prices spanning decades, methodologies, and dozens of countries, and stronger than any alternative value base that has been tested.

Why the Regularity Holds: Statistical Mechanics

Econophysics explains why labor values predict prices. The derivation rests on the same mathematics that governs physical systems.

Drăgulescu and Yakovenko (2000, European Physical Journal B) demonstrated through agent-based simulations that when many agents randomly exchange conserved money, the equilibrium distribution converges to an exponential Boltzmann-Gibbs form, P(m) ∝ exp(−m/T), where T = M/N is the average money per agent, the economic “temperature”. This is the same distribution governing energy among molecules in a gas. The result holds regardless of specific exchange rules, requiring only two ingredients: conservation of money in transactions and a large number of interacting agents.

Ian Wright extended this framework to production. In agent-based models where “zero-intelligence” agents trade randomly subject to budget and production constraints, market prices gravitate toward natural prices proportional to labor values. Correlations are r = 0.96 in ten-commodity economies (Wright 2008, Review of Political Economy; developed further in Classical Econophysics, Routledge, 2009). No agent calculates labor values. The system-level outcome emerges from conservation constraints and the law of large numbers, just as the Boltzmann distribution of molecular energies emerges from energy conservation and large particle numbers without any molecule “choosing” its energy level.

Wright drew three conclusions. First, the labor value of a commodity functions as an attractor for its market price. Second, market prices function as error signals that allocate available social labor between sectors of production. Third, the tendency of prices to approach labor values is the monetary expression of a simple commodity economy’s tendency to allocate social labor efficiently. The constant of proportionality between labor values and equilibrium prices is the Monetary Expression of Labour-time (MELT). The ratio of the aggregate rate of money exchange to the aggregate rate of labor-time exchanged in the form of commodities.

Wright’s “implicit microfoundations” approach (2009, Economics: The Open-Access, Open-Assessment E-Journal) formalized the methodological principle. In statistical mechanics, knowledge of each molecule’s trajectory is not needed to predict gas laws. The “particle nature” of economic agents (many, weakly coordinated) dominates their “mechanical nature” (specific optimization behavior). From conservation constraints alone, his model generates the same statistical signatures observed in real capitalist economies: an exponential distribution of individual wage income with a Pareto tail for capital income (reproducing the two-class structure identified empirically by Yakovenko), a power-law distribution of firm sizes, a Laplace distribution of growth rates, an exponential distribution of recession durations, and a gamma-like distribution of profit rates. All of these emerge without any assumption about individual optimization.
The derivation chain runs: conservation law → maximum entropy principle → Boltzmann-Gibbs equilibrium → labor values as statistical attractors for prices.

The Class Structure as Statistical Regularity

Separate empirical work confirmed the class structure these models predict. Analysis of US tax data showed the lower approximately 97% of the income distribution follows an exponential law (additive wage income) while the upper approximately 3% follows a Pareto power law (multiplicative capital income). Wright’s agent-based models, which derive from production-and-exchange dynamics rather than empirical curve-fitting, independently reproduce this same two-class structure: an exponential bulk generated by conservative additive exchange and a Pareto tail generated by multiplicative capital returns. The two-class structure has a precise physical interpretation. The exponential (thermal) class corresponds to conservative money exchange in transactions. The Pareto (superthermal) class corresponds to compounding capital-gains income. The definitive review appeared in Yakovenko and Rosser’s 2009 Reviews of Modern Physics paper (81: 1703–1725). Ludwig and Yakovenko (2022) verified this two-class structure across thirty-six years of US data (1983–2018), and Tao et al. (2019) across sixty-seven countries.

The significance of this finding is that the class structure of capitalism is not a contingent historical feature that could be reformed away with the right policies. It is a statistical regularity arising from the same conservation laws that govern physical systems. The exponential distribution of the lower class is the maximum entropy distribution subject to a conservation constraint on money. It is the overwhelmingly most probable macrostate. The Pareto tail of the upper class arises from a different mechanism: multiplicative returns on capital, where income changes are proportional to existing holdings rather than additive. The boundary between the two classes, at approximately the 97th percentile, is remarkably stable across time and across countries with very different political and institutional arrangements. This does not mean the class structure cannot be changed. It means that changing it requires altering the underlying economic relations (conservation constraints, the mode of exchange, the social relations of production). Simply adjusting tax rates or regulatory frameworks within a system whose fundamental dynamics remain capitalist is insufficient.

Money Creation as Redistribution

The conservation-law framework has a direct bearing on how contemporary money creation is understood. If value is conserved in exchange, and if money functions as a claim on the products of social labor, then the process by which money enters the economy cannot create new value. It can only redistribute existing claims.

The Bank of England’s 2014 Quarterly Bulletin paper by McLeay, Radia, and Thomas confirmed what heterodox economists had long argued that the majority of money in the modern economy is created by commercial banks making loans. When a bank approves a mortgage or a business loan, it does not lend out pre-existing deposits. It credits the borrower’s account with new deposits, simultaneously creating an asset (the loan) and a liability (the deposit) on its balance sheet. The money supply expands with every new loan and contracts as loans are repaid. This is now the mainstream understanding of money creation, endorsed by central banks including the Bundesbank (2017) and the Swiss National Bank (Jordan, 2018). What banks create is private money backed by the borrower’s obligation to repay, a transformation of an illiquid claim (the borrower’s future income) into a liquid one (a bank deposit), not a conjuring of value from nothing. For the conservation-law framework the implication is that each loan creates a pair of offsetting ledger entries, a loan asset and a deposit liability. This is not a net addition to real wealth.

From the standpoint of econophysics, this process does not violate conservation at the level of real value, because what banks create are nominal claims, not real goods or labor. The total stock of commodities available for purchase at any moment is determined by the productive economy: by the labor, materials, and capital goods currently deployed. When new money enters circulation through bank lending, the borrower gains purchasing power, an immediate claim on real goods and services. But that purchasing power is not created ex nihilo. It is transferred from other holders of money whose existing holdings now represent a smaller share of total nominal claims on the same stock of real output. The conservation law operates at the level of real appropriation, the actual command over labor and its products, even as the nominal money supply fluctuates.

Cockshott and Zachariah formalize this in their 2014 paper “Conservation Laws, Financial Entropy and the Eurozone Crisis” (Economics: The Open-Access, Open-Assessment E-Journal, Vol. 8, 2014-5) by distinguishing real appropriation from symbolic appropriation. Real appropriation is the acquisition of actual goods, services, and labor-time. Symbolic appropriation is the acquisition of money tokens and financial claims. Credit creation is a mechanism of symbolic appropriation that enables real appropriation by redistributing command over resources. A firm that obtains a bank loan and uses it to purchase machinery or hire workers has appropriated real resources. The seller of the machinery and the workers receive money tokens. But the total quantity of real goods and labor available in the economy has not changed as a result of the loan being issued. What has changed is who commands those resources. Cockshott and Zachariah further argue that a country running a persistent trade deficit is engaging in real appropriation of the surplus product of others while providing symbolic appropriation (money tokens, credit) in return, and that the accumulated debt this generates is the mirror image of the accumulated real wealth transferred. Domestically, the banking system’s power to create credit is a power to redistribute real command over resources. It does not expand the total stock of resources available.

The eighteenth-century Irish-French banker and economist Richard Cantillon first identified this redistributive dynamic. When new money enters an economy, it does not affect all agents simultaneously. The first recipients, those closest to the point of monetary injection, can spend before prices adjust to reflect the increased money supply. Later recipients face higher prices without having benefited from the initial spending. This pattern, now called the Cantillon effect, applies to every form of money creation: gold discoveries, bank lending, and central bank asset purchases alike. The effect is a redistribution of purchasing power from later recipients to earlier ones, mediated by the uneven diffusion of new money through the price system. The term “Cantillon effect” was popularized by Mark Blaug in his history of economic thought, though the phenomenon Cantillon described had been recognized under various names since the eighteenth century. The core observation is that money is non-neutral in its distributional consequences regardless of the specific monetary regime in operation.
In the contemporary economy this dynamic operates through two principal channels. The first is commercial bank lending. As confirmed by the Bank of England and the credit creation literature (Werner, 2014, International Review of Financial Analysis; Ryan-Collins, Greenham, Werner, and Jackson, 2011, Where Does Money Come From?), banks direct the majority of their lending not toward productive enterprise but toward the purchase of existing assets, particularly real estate and financial securities. Shaxson (2018, The Finance Curse) found that only approximately 25 percent of UK bank lending finances productive economic activity; the remaining 75 percent finances purchases of financial assets and property. This lending pattern generates what Bossone (2021, Post Keynesian Economics Society Working Paper) identifies as commercial bank seigniorage. Because banks create their own funding through deposit creation at near-zero marginal cost, they extract a rent analogous to the seigniorage traditionally associated with sovereign money issuance. Macfarlane, Ryan-Collins, Bjerg, Nielsen, and McCann (2017, New Economics Foundation) estimated that UK commercial banks earned approximately £23 billion per year in seigniorage from credit creation during the period 1998–2016, compared to approximately £1.2 billion per year in state seigniorage from banknote issuance. When credit flows predominantly into asset markets, the effect is to inflate the prices of assets already held disproportionately by the wealthy. The mechanism is simple. New money bids up the price of housing and equities without a corresponding increase in the real output of the economy. The result is a transfer of real purchasing power from non-asset-holders (who face higher prices for housing, goods, and services) to asset-holders (whose nominal wealth increases).

The second channel is central bank intervention, particularly the large-scale asset purchase programs known as quantitative easing (QE). Following the 2008 financial crisis, the Federal Reserve, the European Central Bank, the Bank of England, and the Bank of Japan collectively created trillions in new reserves to purchase government bonds, mortgage-backed securities, and in some cases corporate bonds and equities from private financial institutions. The stated aim was to lower long-term interest rates, restore bank lending, and stimulate a wealth effect through rising asset prices. The redistributive consequences were extensively documented: asset price inflation benefited primarily those who already held financial assets (Montecino and Epstein, 2015), while non-asset-holders experienced the consequences of rising housing costs and stagnant real wages. The Bank for International Settlements acknowledged in its 2021 Annual Report that every change in monetary policy stance inevitably redistributes interest income between debtors and creditors and reallocates wealth depending on asset holdings. Research reviewed by Positive Money EU (2024) synthesizing approximately forty empirical studies found that expansionary monetary policy has, in general, increased wealth inequality, because the wealth increase due to stock price appreciation far outweighs valuation gains in real estate, even in jurisdictions where homeownership is broadly distributed.

The econophysics perspective situates these observations within the conservation-law framework. The Drăgulescu-Yakovenko result, that random conservative exchange among many agents produces an exponential Boltzmann-Gibbs distribution, depends on a constraint. Money is conserved in transactions. When credit creation expands the nominal money supply without a corresponding expansion in real output, it does not create a new conservation constraint. It alters the distribution of claims on the same conserved quantity of real value. The exponential (thermal) class, whose income derives from additive wage transactions, absorbs the inflationary cost of monetary expansion as a dilution of purchasing power. The Pareto (superthermal) class, whose income derives from multiplicative capital returns, captures the gains from asset price inflation. The two-class structure identified by Yakovenko, Ludwig, and Tao et al. is therefore not merely reproduced but actively reinforced by the mechanisms of contemporary money creation. Credit expansion and quantitative easing do not alter the fundamental conservation constraint; they redistribute within it, systematically transferring real command over resources from the wage-earning majority to the asset-holding minority.
The class division between the exponential and Pareto distributions is therefore not a policy failure correctable by monetary reform alone. It is a structural consequence of the rules governing exchange and accumulation. Changing the monetary regime, whether by moving to sovereign money creation, full-reserve banking, or some other arrangement, would alter the channels through which redistribution occurs, but would not by itself abolish the class structure so long as the underlying relations of production and the multiplicative logic of capital accumulation remain intact.

The Falling Rate of Profit

The tension between conservation in exchange and compound accumulation plays out over historical time. Wright’s agent-based model in Classical Econophysics produces a gamma-like distribution of profit rates across firms, with time-varying parameters indicating a long-term downward trajectory. Farjoun and Machover had proposed this reframing in Laws of Chaos (Verso, 1983). The rate of profit is not a single number tending toward equilibrium but a probability distribution whose parameters shift over time. The dispersion of profit rates across firms and sectors is not noise to be averaged away but a structural feature of capitalist economies, the economic analogue of the distribution of molecular velocities in a gas.

The most comprehensive dataset is Esteban Maito’s (2014, Universidad de Buenos Aires), covering fourteen countries back to 1870. Maito found a clear secular downward trend in core capitalist economies. From approximately 40%+ in the late nineteenth century to roughly 14.6% at the cyclical peak preceding the 2008 financial crisis. Even at the top of the business cycle, after the neoliberal partial recovery, the rate was barely a third of its nineteenth-century level. The decline was very regular from the 1870s through the 1970s. The rate of profit in core countries was consistently lower than in peripheral ones, though the latter experienced steeper postwar declines. Basu, Huato, Jauregui, and Wasner (2022), using the Extended Penn World Tables for a global calculation, found the world rate of profit declined approximately 25% between 1960 and 2019, driven primarily by a falling output-capital ratio (~0.8% per year decline) that outpaced a rising profit share (~0.25% per year increase). Basu and Manolakos (2013) found weak evidence of a long-run downward trend in the US rate of profit, declining at approximately 0.3% per year over 1948–2007. Carchedi and Roberts compiled a global analysis in World in Crisis (Haymarket Books, 2018), examining profit rate data across multiple economies and finding the pattern broadly consistent with Marx’s law, including the cyclical relationship between profit rate troughs and the onset of major recessions. Cockshott and Zachariah (2014) showed that a fundamental structural tension exists between money conservation in transactions and exponential capital accumulation, the same tension that generates periodic crises and has historically driven the evolution of monetary forms, from gold to banknotes to electronic credit.

There is a methodological dispute concerning historical cost versus replacement cost measurement of capital stock. Andrew Kliman, using historical-cost measures consistent with the Temporal Single System Interpretation, argues the US profit rate never sustainably recovered after the post-1960s decline. Duménil and Lévy, using replacement-cost measures, find a genuine but incomplete partial recovery; by 2000, the profit rate stood at roughly half its 1948 value. Robert Brenner accepts falling profits but rejects Marx’s explanation (rising organic composition), proposing instead that intensified international competition caused persistent overcapacity. The econophysics approach is agnostic on these interpretive disputes. It treats the profit rate as a distributional phenomenon whose long-run trajectory is consistent with the tendency Marx described, without requiring his specific causal mechanism.

Michael Heinrich’s 1996 Science & Society article, comparing Marx’s 1864–65 manuscript (published in MEGA in 1993) with Engels’s 1894 edition of Capital Volume III, documented extensive editorial modifications: Engels transformed Marx’s seven chapters with thirty-four headings into seven parts with fifty-two chapters and ninety-two headings, made unmarked insertions, and deleted whole paragraphs. The famous passage about “the poverty of the masses as the ultimate reason for all real crisis” was in brackets in Marx’s manuscript; Engels integrated it unmarked into the main text. Heinrich’s 2013 Monthly Review article pushed further, claiming the tendency of the rate of profit to fall (TRPF) is logically indeterminate since rising organic composition and rising rate of surplus value both result from the same process (increasing productivity). Kliman, Freeman, Potts, Gusev, and Cooney (2013) responded that Heinrich confuses the law with a mechanical prediction. Carchedi and Roberts (2013) argued Heinrich misidentifies the rate of surplus value as part of the law rather than as a counter-tendency. A 2024 Capital & Class article by Christos Balomenos, examining MEGA archival materials directly, concluded that Engels’s editing, despite significant interventions, remains faithful to Marx’s analysis.

The econophysics reframing partially dissolves these debates. The classical argument asked whether a single variable must fall given rising organic composition. The statistical-mechanical argument asks whether the parameters of a distribution shift in a way consistent with the empirical record. The data suggest they do. The tension between money conservation in transactions and the compound accumulation of capital is a structural feature of the system rather than a deduction from a single algebraic identity.

What This Establishes

These findings establish four things for the purpose of this proposal. First, labor values reliably predict prices, a democratic body that directs production according to socially necessary labor time is not operating blindly. Second, the class structure of capitalism is a statistical regularity arising from the same conservation laws that govern physical systems, and it is amenable to scientific analysis and intervention. Third, contemporary money creation, whether through commercial bank lending or central bank asset purchases, does not create new value but redistributes existing claims on real output, systematically reinforcing the two-class structure by channeling newly created purchasing power toward asset-holders at the expense of wage-earners. Fourth, the rate of profit tends to fall over the long run, generating crises that destroy productive capacity while human needs go unmet. The question is what to do about it.

Philosophies of Contradiction: Marx contra Buddha

Buddhism begins with impermanence: everything changes, clinging to what changes produces suffering, and no fixed self persists through the flux. Marxist dialectics begins with contradiction: every system generates internal tensions that undermine it, and development arises from the working-out of those tensions. Both reject static substances. Both insist on process. Both claim that understanding change is the key to liberation.

They disagree on what to do about change. Buddhism turns inward, toward meditation, compassion, and the dissolution of conceptual grasping. Marxism turns outward, toward the transformation of material conditions. This post looks at where they converge and where they split.

Buddhism

Buddhism starts from the three marks of existence: anicca (impermanence), dukkha (unsatisfactoriness), and anatta (non-self). Because things are impermanent, clinging to them produces suffering. Because nothing persists unchanged, the fixed self is not a really existing object.

Theravada systematizes this through the Abhidhamma, a taxonomy classifying reality into four categories of ultimate realities (paramattha dhamma): consciousness (citta), mental factors (cetasika), material phenomena (rupa), and nibbana, altogether comprising well over a hundred distinct types. The label “atomism” is sometimes applied but is misleading; these are categories of experience, not material particles. The school that most closely resembled ontological atomism was the Sarvastivada, which held that dharmas are discrete, real entities existing across past, present, and future. The Theravadins rejected this in the Kathavatthu, arguing that material phenomena endure for a stretch of time while only mental phenomena are truly momentary, a position Y. Karunadasa calls “critical realism.”

Mahayana deepens impermanence into emptiness (sunyata): all phenomena lack inherent, independent existence. Through compassion (karuna), practitioners generate bodhicitta, the intention to achieve enlightenment for the benefit of all beings. Given anatta, Mahayana is skeptical about individual enlightenment. The causal web is all there is, and the sorrows of others will find a way to pull a person back, others being a reflection of one’s own mind. Enlightenment, on this reading, is an emergent phenomenon that arises in colonies of consciousness, not in isolated individuals. These colonies are depicted in the brightly colored mandalas of Vajrayana.

The most vivid expression of this mutual arising is Indra’s Net, from the Avatamsaka Sutra, developed by the Huayan school: an infinite net with a jewel at every intersection, each reflecting every other, each reflection containing reflections of all others. Patriarch Fazang (643–712) demonstrated this for Empress Wu by arranging ten mirrors around a room with a Buddha statue and a torch; the room filled with reflections within reflections. What the metaphor illustrates is interpenetration (yuánróng): each phenomenon contains all others. This must be distinguished from dependent origination (pratityasamutpada), which is primarily the twelve-link chain (nidanas), a sequential conditioning from ignorance through aging and death. Nagarjuna reinterpreted dependent origination as equivalent to emptiness itself (Mulamadhyamakakarika 24.18). Huayan goes further: simultaneous, non-hierarchical mutual containment, more like ecological reasoning where everything in the network causes everything else.

The Catuskoti

Nagarjuna (c. 150–250 CE), the most important Buddhist philosopher after the Buddha himself, developed the analysis of emptiness systematically in his Mulamadhyamakakarika. His principal logical tool was the catuskoti (“four corners”), a framework from early Indian thought. For any subject s and predicate P, it lays out four possibilities: (1) s is P; (2) s is not-P; (3) s is both P and not-P; (4) s is neither P nor not-P.

Nagarjuna used the catuskoti in both positive and negative forms to demonstrate sunyata. In Chapter 1 of the Mulamadhyamakakarika, he tests all four possibilities on causation (self-causation, other-causation, both, neither) and shows each leads to absurdity. His negation uses prasajya-pratisedha (non-implicative negation), which is absolute, not a matter of degree. In early Buddhism, the catuskoti was applied selectively to specific undeclared questions (avyakata), such as whether the world is eternal. Nagarjuna turned it into a universal tool of deconstruction. Graham Priest has attempted to formalize it using paraconsistent logic, though this remains controversial. Later Mahayana theorists observed that multiple mutually contradictory descriptions of experience are possible and that none can be privileged over the others by reasoning alone, giving rise to non-foundationalism: the stance that no conceptual framework has privileged access to reality.

Buddhist Epistemology

Buddhism accepts exactly two forms of proof (pramana): pratyaksha (direct perception) and anumana (inference). This was formalized by Dignaga (c. 480–540 CE) and developed by Dharmakirti. Scripture is not accepted as an independent source, though Dharmakirti allowed it for “radically inaccessible things” such as karma, provided it does not contradict perception and inference. The contrast with other Indian schools is instructive: the Charvaka school, ancient India’s materialist and atheist tradition, accepted only perception, rejecting inference as unreliable; Advaita Vedanta accepted six: perception, inference, testimony, analogy, postulation and absence. Buddhism’s acceptance of inference is what allowed it to build elaborate philosophical systems.

Marx’s Dialectical Method

The canard that the Hegelian dialectic proceeds through “thesis, antithesis, synthesis” originates from Chalybäus’s widely read Historische Entwicklung der speculativen Philosophie von Kant bis Hegel (1837). In reality, the formula was attributed to Fichte, on whom Chalybäus imposed the triadic schema; Fichte’s own procedure does not reduce to it.

Hegel himself warned that triadic form, when reduced to an external pattern imposed on content, becomes a “lifeless schema.” What he actually proposed is a method with three moments: the moment of Understanding, where a concept appears stable; the Dialectical moment, where its one-sidedness causes it to pass into its opposite; and the Speculative moment, where the opposition is grasped as a unity. Each stage is aufgehoben, or sublated: simultaneously negated, preserved, and raised to a higher level.

Marx took Hegel’s method and redirected it from ideas to material life. According to Althusser, Marx transformed the internal structure of the dialectic itself, keeping immanent contradiction, sublation, and the conviction that development arises from the inner nature of its subject matter, while discarding the idealist framework, the Absolute, and Hegel’s tendency to reconcile reason with whatever happens to exist. Marx himself never used the term “dialectical materialism.” That phrase was coined by Joseph Dietzgen in his 1887 Excursions of a Socialist into the Domain of Epistemology and popularized by Georgi Plekhanov from 1891.

The most influential application of Marx’s method is his analysis of capitalist crisis. Competition compels investment in labor-saving machinery, raising the proportion of capital invested in equipment relative to labor. Since surplus value derives only from living labor, the rate of profit tends to decline even as productivity increases, what Marx called “the most important law of modern political economy.” He identified counteracting tendencies, and scholars of the Neue Marx-Lektüre, particularly Michael Heinrich, have argued that Engels’s editing of Capital Vol. III may have overemphasized this tendency’s centrality. There is also the overproduction feedback loop: if capitalists pay workers less to increase margins, workers cannot buy enough products, decreasing profits. The instability is structural, not accidental.

The question of why workers embraced fascism rather than revolution drove Marxists toward psychoanalysis: Erich Fromm on the psychological need to flee from autonomy, Herbert Marcuse on “surplus repression” and the “performance principle,” and Slavoj Žižek on ideology as a libidinally invested structure of fantasy and enjoyment. This synthesis also opened the question of what Marxist theory would look like if social democracy were understood as capitalism repressing socialism. Using the Freudian mechanisms (repression, disavowal, foreclosure) one arrives at different political models: under repression, socialist ideas return as displaced compromise formations like welfare states and labor protections; under disavowal, capitalism simultaneously knows and denies the need for transformation; under foreclosure, socialism is radically excluded from the thinkable, and what is foreclosed returns not as manageable reform but as violent eruption.

Comparisons

Both traditions identify universal causal interconnection as fundamental, and both hold that contradictions or tensions within a system drive its development.

The Buddhist catuskoti and Kant’s antinomies address the same territory. The Buddha’s unanswered questions overlap with Kant’s antinomies: whether the world is finite or infinite corresponds to the First Antinomy (the world’s spatiotemporal limits), while whether the self survives death maps more closely to the Third and Fourth (freedom, causality, and the existence of a necessary being). But the analyses diverge.

Kant divided his antinomies into mathematical (concerning size and composition) and dynamical (concerning causality and necessity). For the mathematical antinomies, both thesis and antithesis are false, since they share the faulty presupposition that the world is a completed totality. For the dynamical antinomies, both can be true in different respects: determinism governs phenomena while freedom can be posited at the noumenal level. Žižek’s characteristically Hegelian move is to transpose these epistemological antinomies into ontological ones: Hegel’s reproach to Kant is that Kant is too gentle with things, that he locates the antinomies in the limitations of reason when they should be located in reality itself. Žižek maps this onto Lacan’s formulas of sexuation: the mathematical antinomies correspond to the “feminine” logic of the “not-all” (no totality, no exception, both sides false), while the dynamical antinomies correspond to the “masculine” logic of exception (a constitutive exception grounds the universal, both sides can be true).

Where Kant declares both sides false for mathematical antinomies, Nagarjuna rejects all four positions of the catuskoti. Žižek suggests a third way: rather than embodying the contradiction as in Buddhist practice or resolving it as in Hegel, treat it as a formal term in your statements, and work with the contradiction rather than dissolving or transcending it.

Non-Identity and Emptiness

Theodor Adorno’s Negative Dialectics (1966) stands as perhaps the most rigorous philosophical argument for the limits of dialectical thinking from within the dialectical tradition itself. His core claim is what commentators have called the “non-identity thesis.” All conceptual thought operates through subsumption, classifying particular things under general categories. This process always leaves a remainder. Adorno calls this compulsive drive toward conceptual unity “identity thinking” (Identitätsdenken), and traces it not just to an epistemic habit but to social forces, specifically the capitalist exchange principle, which demands the equivalence of things that are not equivalent. The “preponderance of the object” (Vorrang des Objekts) is his materialist thesis: the epistemic subject is itself objectively constituted by society, and no object can be fully captured through identity thinking.

Adorno and Kant acknowledge a gap between concept and reality, but their responses diverge sharply. Kant consigns the thing-in-itself to a permanently inaccessible transcendental realm, what Adorno calls “peephole metaphysics,” a section title in Negative Dialectics. Western metaphysics, “except for heretics,” imagines humanity trapped in a closet, peering through a peephole at a reality forever out of reach. Adorno refuses the permanent exile. Identity thinking dominates because of specific historical and social conditions (capitalism, the exchange principle) and not because of the permanent structure of human cognition. Through “determinate negation,” that is, specific and concrete criticisms of false identifications, thought can gain indirect access to what escapes it.

Against Hegel, whose dialectic in the Science of Logic aims at a final reconciliation (the identity of identity and nonidentity), Adorno retains the method of thinking through contradictions while refusing the affirmative moment of synthesis. Where Hegel says “the whole is the true,” Adorno counters: “the whole is the false.” This line from Minima Moralia (1951) distills the argument he had developed with Max Horkheimer in Dialectic of Enlightenment (1947), where they traced how Enlightenment rationality, in its drive to dominate nature and eliminate myth, paradoxically reverted to a new form of mythology: instrumental reason as a totalizing system that recognizes nothing outside itself. Negative Dialectics draws the consequences: its final section, “Meditations on Metaphysics,” argues that after Auschwitz, metaphysical questions can no longer be posed as they were before. The result is a thinking that must go on while knowing it cannot redeem itself, a condition of permanent, productive discomfort that Adorno refuses to resolve. This is Hegel’s “bone in the throat”, which Žižek identifies with psychoanalytic trauma.

Nagarjuna’s emptiness and Adorno’s non-identity both name what escapes conceptual capture. Both deny that any conceptual system can be fully self-contained. But Adorno’s non-identity is historically constituted, arising from specific social conditions, while Nagarjuna’s emptiness is an ontological thesis about all phenomena. Adorno demands that we change the conditions that produce false identifications. Nagarjuna demands that we see through all identifications as such. One points toward revolution; the other points toward realization.

Criticism of Buddhism from Dialectical Materialism

The broader dialectical-materialist case against Buddhism is this: Marx’s method insists that contradictions are not errors to be dissolved through changes in perception. They are objective features of material reality that can only be resolved through material transformation. Buddhism’s dependent origination identifies something genuine, the interconnectedness of all phenomena, but it treats this interconnectedness as grounds for equanimity rather than intervention. The Marxist response is that identifying the web of causation is the beginning of analysis, not the end. The question is always: which nodes in the causal web are decisive? Which contradictions are principal and which secondary? And crucially: what material forces can be mobilized to transform the web?

Slavoj Žižek sharpens this into a specific critique. At the sociological level, he argues that “Western Buddhism” functions as the ideal ideology of late capitalism, a way to participate fully in the capitalist dynamic while maintaining the appearance of inner peace. At the philosophical level, he acknowledges that Buddhism and Lacanian psychoanalysis share the insight that there is no substantial Self and that “the big Other does not exist.” But he parts company on what he considers Buddhism’s ultimate quietism: its approach to contradictions (dissolving the self, accepting the void) avoids the properly dialectical confrontation with negativity. Buddhism’s nirvana principle, Žižek argues, is the highest expression of the pleasure principle (the dissolution of tension), whereas the Freudian death drive persists beyond and against it.

Žižek claims, provocatively, that Marx is more idealistic than Hegel. In Less Than Nothing (2012), he argues that Hegel understood thought follows being (the owl of Minerva flies only at dusk), making Hegel paradoxically the more materialist thinker. Marx, by asserting that revolutionary thought will precede and guide being, commits what Žižek calls an “idealist reversal of Hegel.” From this position, Žižek develops his argument about the figure of the master: drawing on Lacan’s “discourse of the analyst,” the authentic master serves as a “vanishing mediator” who gives people back to themselves, delivering them to the abyss of their freedom rather than commanding submission. Buddhism, on this reading, offers the vanishing mediator’s dissolution without the confrontation, freedom without the abyss.

If the mechanisms of domination operate at the level of desire and unconscious investment (surplus repression, the performance principle), then Buddhism’s injunction to dissolve desire is not a liberation but an accommodation. It leaves the structures of surplus repression intact while training the individual to stop noticing them.

Buddhism’s concept of skillful means (upaya-kausalya) is the closest the tradition comes to strategic thinking. But its scope is limited to the subjective transformation of individuals. A dialectical-materialist “skillful means” would ask: what are the material conditions that produce mass suffering, and what social forces are capable of transforming them?

Buddhism’s own history illustrates the point. Within Mahayana, the rangtong (self-empty) position, championed by Tsongkhapa and the Gelug school, holds that everything, including ultimate reality, is empty of inherent existence. The shentong (other-empty) position, systematized by Dolpopa and the Jonang school, holds that ultimate reality truly exists and is empty only of defilements. Each side accuses the other of a basic Buddhist error: rangtong critics call shentong eternalism; shentong critics call rangtong nihilism. Karl Brunnhölzl has suggested the two positions describe the same reality from different angles, one analytical and one experiential. But the dispute did not remain philosophical. In 1642, the Gelug school, allied with the Mongol warlord Güshri Khan, invaded central Tibet and established the Fifth Dalai Lama as political and spiritual ruler. The Jonang, who had allied with the rival Tsangpa dynasty, were suppressed: their monasteries were forcibly converted to Gelug institutions, and the writings of Dolpopa and other shentong proponents were sealed and banned. The tradition survived only in remote Amdo. The 14th Dalai Lama has acknowledged that the suppression was primarily political rather than doctrinal. The Jonang remain without parliamentary representation in the Tibetan exile government to this day, despite decades of petitions and the Dalai Lama’s own endorsement of their claim.

This history argues against the claim that subjective cultivation is more peaceful than revolution. Here was a tradition devoted to compassion, non-attachment, and the dissolution of the ego, and when material and political interests were at stake, it deployed Mongol cavalry. The philosophical disagreement between rangtong and shentong became the intellectual veneer for what was fundamentally a contest over territory, patronage, and political control. No amount of meditation on emptiness prevented the Gelug establishment from behaving exactly as any other political faction would. The dialectical materialist would say: of course it didn’t. Contradictions rooted in material conditions are not resolved by changes in consciousness. They are resolved by changes in the conditions themselves.

The irony is that Buddhism’s philosophical apparatus is sophisticated enough to identify the interdependence that Marxism also identifies, but its practical orientation neutralizes the revolutionary implications of its own insights. It is, in Marxist terms, a philosophy that grasps the contradiction and then flinches from the conclusion.

The Subjectivity Problem

Mahayana’s emphasis on mutual liberation and causal interdependence among consciousnesses is genuinely valuable. The Huayan vision of interdependence, beings liberating each other within a causal network, is closer to ecological and systems thinking than anything else in ancient philosophy. But the tools Mahayana offers for achieving this vision are almost entirely subjective: meditation, compassion cultivation, bodhicitta generation, visualization.

However, the conditions that prevent mutual liberation are largely physical and institutional. Poverty, disease, coercive labor, and political violence are not primarily problems of individual consciousness. A society of meditating bodhisattvas who leave these structures untouched has not achieved mutual liberation; it has achieved mutual comfort in the presence of suffering. Consider what it would take to address the suffering Mahayana identifies: safe drinking water requires engineering and municipal governance; freedom from coercive labor requires enforceable labor law; protection from political violence requires functioning courts and accountable security forces. None of these are products of meditation. They are products of political organization, institutional design, and material investment.

The means that is actually skillful is the deliberate restructuring of material conditions, institutions, and power relations so that the physical prerequisites for a flourishing life are met. Buddhism’s own logic demands this conclusion. If all beings are interdependent, and if the suffering of one drags down the rest, then the rational response is to change the conditions that produce suffering, not merely to change one’s attitude toward those conditions. The Mahayana theory of interdependence, taken seriously, is an argument for structural politics, an implication the tradition has mostly declined to draw.

The Privilege Problem

The leisure to train the mind is a privilege afforded by society. Who grows the food while the practitioner meditates? What institutions maintain the peace that permits contemplation? Historically, the Buddhist monastic system was supported by lay donations, royal patronage, and landed estates. In Sri Lanka, the great monasteries of Anuradhapura held extensive land grants from the Sinhalese kings, and in Tibet, monastic estates functioned as feudal landlords collecting rents and labor obligations from peasant tenants. The monk’s freedom to pursue liberation was purchased by the labor of people who did not share that freedom.

This is a structural dependency. If interdependent causation means that all phenomena are reflected in others, then the meditator’s equanimity arises in dependence on the farmer’s labor, the soldier’s protection, and the administrator’s governance. To practice as though one’s insight were self-generated is to commit exactly the error of svabhava (inherent existence) that the philosophy condemns.

If enlightenment is an emergent property arising in colonies of consciousness rather than fixed selves, then the material conditions of the community are not external to the spiritual project. The tradition of “engaged Buddhism” associated with Thich Nhat Hanh represents a partial response, but it tends to frame social engagement as an extension of mindfulness rather than as a structural politics. The question is not whether meditation is good for those who can afford it, but whether the resources devoted to contemplative institutions would do more good if redirected toward the material conditions that make contemplation possible for everyone.

Criticism of Buddhism from Mechanical Materialism

Dialectical-materialist criticisms focus on Buddhism’s failure to translate philosophical insight into material transformation. Mechanical materialism is more concerned with how reliable knowledge is produced.

  1. The Impermanence Argument Does Not Work

It does not follow from impermanence that nothing can have an essential nature. The conclusion requires a change in what kinds of things have essential natures, not the elimination of essential natures altogether. Physical objects do not have fixed natures across time, but the laws by which physical objects transform could have essential natures. Say object s is P at time t and Q at time t’. Then s is not essentially P or Q (or both or neither). But the law that s transforms into Q in time t’ – t under certain conditions could be essentially fixed.

“Impermanence” is not specific enough to be philosophically decisive. It tells you that phenomena change; it does not tell you what they change into, under what conditions, or according to what regularities. To have skillful means, one needs to know which phenomena transform into which other phenomena at which points on the timeline. Discovering that requires science, not meditation.

Nagarjuna’s Madhyamaka shows that no object has svabhava (inherent existence); what it does not show is that the pattern of transformation between objects lacks regularity. If the pattern is regular, then there is something fixed after all. Buddhism notices change but does not systematically investigate its structure. The move from “everything changes” to “everything is empty” skips the step that matters most: discovering the laws of transformation.

  1. The Epistemology Problem

Buddhism accepts perception and inference as its two valid sources of knowledge. The ancient Charvakas went further and rejected inference as well. They were right that inference alone, without experimental grounding, produces elaborate systems that may be internally consistent and still entirely wrong. The Buddhist argument for the afterlife illustrates the danger: reasoning from the premise that every cause must have an effect, Buddhist philosophers concluded that moral actions must produce consequences in a future life, since justice is not reliably observed in the present one. The inference is valid given its premises, but its premises are assumed rather than tested.

Think about what it means to trust a thermometer. A rational being doesn’t trust the instrument itself, but the institutional framework behind it, the practices of calibration, peer review, and replication that make the reading reliable. A thermometer sold by a snake oil salesman deserves no confidence. It is the institutional framework that merits trust because it carries out trustworthy practices. That is the sense in which the anecdotal perception accepted by traditional Indian epistemology does not merit trust. Perceptions can be used, but it is irrational to believe them without institutional verification. Belief is reserved for the institutional systems that produce reliable knowledge, and building those systems is a political project, not a contemplative one.

Systematic experimentation within institutional frameworks was not accessible to ancient Indians at their level of social development. The experimental method requires a surplus-producing economy, a community of investigators, instruments of measurement, institutions for recording and transmitting results, and a culture that values falsification over authority. Truth, in this view, is not available without the material and institutional conditions that make science possible.

A related problem is Buddhism’s claims about meditative knowledge. In the Tevijja-Vacchagotta Sutta (MN 71), the Buddha explicitly denies simultaneous omniscience, claiming instead three specific knowledges. In the Kannakatthala Sutta (MN 90), he offers a qualified, dispositional omniscience: it is possible to know all, though not simultaneously. Later Mahayana texts affirm literal omniscience outright. But traditional Buddhist cosmology includes a flat earth (Mount Meru, 80,000 yojanas tall, surrounded by four continents), and the 14th Dalai Lama has acknowledged that Buddhism must defer to science where they disagree. If the tradition’s cosmological claims were wrong, the status of meditative insight as a path to reliable knowledge is correspondingly weakened.

  1. The Meditation Problem

Modern research on meditation has found some genuine benefits but a picture far more modest than the Buddhist tradition claims. A 2014 meta-analysis by Madhav Goyal and colleagues at Johns Hopkins, published in JAMA Internal Medicine, reviewed 47 trials with over 3,500 participants and found moderate evidence that mindfulness meditation improves anxiety, depression, and pain, but low or insufficient evidence for improvements in stress, distress, mental-health-related quality of life, attention, sleep, or substance use. The effect sizes for anxiety and depression were comparable to those of antidepressant medication: notable, but far from transformative liberation. The study also found no evidence that meditation programs were better than any active treatment, including drugs, exercise, and other behavioral therapies.

There is also a growing body of research on adverse effects. A 2020 systematic review by Miguel Farias and colleagues, published in Acta Psychiatrica Scandinavica, analyzed 83 studies with a total of 6,703 participants and found that the overall prevalence of meditation-related adverse events was approximately 8.3%. The most common adverse events were anxiety (reported in 33% of studies reviewed), depression (27%), and cognitive anomalies (25%). A 2021 study by Willoughby Britton and colleagues at Brown University, published in Clinical Psychological Science, used a 44-item interview administered by an independent assessor to measure meditation-related effects following three variants of an eight-week mindfulness-based cognitive therapy program. Of the 96 participants, 58% reported meditation-related experiences with negative valence, 37% reported negative impacts on functioning, and 6% reported lasting bad effects persisting more than one month. The researchers noted that these rates are comparable to those found in other psychological treatments, which contextualizes the harm but also undermines the claim that meditation is uniquely safe. A 2025 population-based study by Nicholas Van Dam and colleagues, also published in Clinical Psychological Science, recruited nearly 900 U.S. adults representing a range of meditation experience levels and confirmed that adverse effects are common among meditators, with risk factors including a history of childhood adversity, symptoms of depression and anxiety, and loneliness.

The traditional Buddhist response, that deterioration is a sign of spiritual progress, is precisely the kind of claim that cannot be tested without independent verification. If both improvement and deterioration count as evidence that the practice works, nothing could count against it.

Criticism of Dialectics

Engels’s Dialectics of Nature (unpublished in his lifetime, assembled from notes dating to 1873–86) identified three universal laws: the transformation of quantity into quality, the interpenetration of opposites, and the negation of the negation, supposedly governing nature, society, and thought alike. Lukács recognized this in History and Class Consciousness (1923): dialectics requires a subject-object relationship, and in nature there is no active subject, making the extension a category error. On the other hand, the Harvard biologists Richard Levins and Richard Lewontin dedicated The Dialectical Biologist (1985) to Engels, “who got it wrong a lot of the time but got it right where it mattered.”

Many leftists have opposed dialectics. Sidney Hook noted that Marx himself never speaks of a “dialectics of nature.” Lucio Colletti argued in Marxism and Hegel (1969; English translation 1973) that Engels and Lenin were wrong to look to Hegel, and that Marx’s true philosophical ancestor was Kant. This was one of the most rigorous attacks on the dialectical tradition from within the left. Colletti maintained that Hegel was an essentially Christian philosopher whose dialectic was explicitly anti-materialist in both intention and effect. The inconsistency lay not in Hegel but in those who tried to adapt him for materialist purposes.

Karl Popper argued that dialectics was unfalsifiable, and that accepting contradictions as literally true renders any system trivially provable through the principle of explosion. This is to mistake formal contradiction for dialectical contradiction.

Althusser attempted a different kind of internal reform. In the same For Marx where he analyzed Marx’s transformation of Hegel, he proposed replacing Hegel’s “simple contradiction” (a single principal contradiction driving history) with “overdetermination”: a model in which multiple contradictions, each with its own temporality and relative autonomy, converge to produce a revolutionary rupture. The concept drew explicitly on Freud’s account of how multiple dream-thoughts condense into a single dream-image. It was a sophisticated solution, though critics noted that Althusser’s structuralism introduced its own rigidities, particularly the sharp distinction between science and ideology, which reproduced a different kind of foundationalism.

The Analytical Marxists of the September Group (G.A. Cohen, Jon Elster, John Roemer, Erik Olin Wright) argued that what was distinctive in Marxism was its substantive claims about the world, not its methodology. Beginning with Cohen’s Karl Marx’s Theory of History: A Defence (1978), they attempted to reconstruct Marx’s core claims using the tools of analytic philosophy, rational choice theory, and game theory, while explicitly jettisoning dialectics as, in Elster’s words, a form of Hegelian obscurantism. Elster’s Making Sense of Marx (1985) concluded that no general theory of history as the development of productive forces could be saved, and that the dialectical method was dispensable. By the late 1990s, most of the group had moved away from Marxism entirely, gravitating toward left-liberal political philosophy in the tradition of Rawls.

A common criticism is the closure problem. If dialectics is truly universal, it should apply even after the revolution. But if communism resolves the fundamental class contradictions, the social dialectic stops, meaning dialectics is not truly universal. Defenders respond that only antagonistic class contradictions cease, while dialectical development continues in other forms. Nevertheless, this reproduces exactly the structure Marx criticized in Hegel: Absolute Knowledge as the end of history.

Alternatives

Neoconfucian criticism of Buddhism

The Neoconfucian tradition drew a useful distinction. The Zhongyong (Doctrine of the Mean) distinguishes between zhong (equilibrium), the calm, unaroused state of mind before feelings are stirred, and hé (harmony), the state in which aroused feelings act in their due degree. Buddhist meditation cultivates equilibrium, the still, pre-arousal state. But the Song dynasty Neoconfucians who developed this distinction (Cheng Yi, Cheng Hao, and above all Zhu Xi, 1130–1200) argued that what matters is harmony: the capacity to respond to the world with active, proportionate engagement.

Zhu Xi’s metaphysics reinforced this practical emphasis. His framework distinguishes li (principle) from qì (material force): li is the pattern or principle inherent in things, while qì is the material substrate through which principle is realized. Neither exists apart from the other; principle without material force is inert, and material force without principle is chaotic. Where Buddhist emptiness dissolves the distinction between principle and appearance, Zhu Xi insists that principle is real and discoverable: the task is not to empty the mind of distinctions but to investigate things (géwù) until their principles become clear. A mind trained only in stillness may achieve equilibrium but fail at harmony, because it has not practiced the dynamic adjustment, guided by knowledge of principle, that real situations demand.

Neoplatonic alternative to Buddhism

Plotinus valued contemplation, but his tradition also emphasized the emanative energy of nous (intellect), the mind’s capacity to generate, differentiate, and structure. In the Neoplatonist hierarchy, the One gives rise to Intellect, Intellect gives rise to Soul, and Soul gives rise to the material world, a process of increasing articulation, not diminishment. The contemplative ideal was therefore not silence but luminous activity: thought thinking itself into greater articulation. Where Buddhist meditation aims at emptying the mind of conceptual content, Neoplatonist contemplation aims at filling it with the most fully articulated content available, the self-thinking of nous. Proclus systematized this further in his Elements of Theology, establishing a hierarchy in which each level of reality both remains in its cause and proceeds outward from it, so that contemplation is not withdrawal but participation in the active self-differentiation of being. The Neoplatonist model offers not the absence of content, but the presence of organized, beautiful content that draws the mind into a more articulate state.

Alternative to dialectics from within Marxism

In Marx in Motion (Oxford University Press, 2020), Thomas Nail argues that before there was a “Hegelian Marx,” there was an “Epicurean Marx”: Marx’s first philosophical engagement was not with Hegel but with Epicurus, in his 1841 doctoral dissertation. For Nail, Marx’s deepest materialism is kinetic and non-teleological: matter in motion without predetermined end goals or universal laws it passively obeys. John Bellamy Foster has called Marx in Motion “the most penetrating account of the origins of Marx’s overall philosophical outlook to appear this century.”

For Lucretius, as Nail reads him, matter is fundamentally indeterminate, flowing, and irreducible to any substance: the Epicurean clinamen (swerve) introduces genuine contingency at the most basic level of reality. What Marx and Lucretius share, on Nail’s account, is that both read Epicurus in the same distinctive way, stressing the continually flowing, non-discrete, and kinetic features of matter. Marx’s later concepts (the metabolic rift, the circuits of capital, the feedback dynamics of crisis) are elaborations of this kinetic insight rather than applications of Hegelian logic. The claim is controversial: critics have argued that Nail overstates the continuity between the 1841 dissertation and the mature Capital.

What makes Nail’s position distinctive within the broader “new materialism” is his insistence on motion rather than substance as the primary category. Where object-oriented ontologists like Graham Harman emphasize the withdrawn interiority of discrete objects, and vital materialists like Jane Bennett stress the agency of nonhuman things, Nail argues that objects and agencies are themselves secondary effects of more fundamental patterns of motion. His Matter and Motion: A Brief History of Kinetic Materialism (Edinburgh University Press, 2023) extends this argument across the full sweep of Western philosophy, from the Minoans to quantum physics.

Potential alternatives to meditation

Based on the above criticisms, what if the goal is not to have a quiet, stable mind? What kind of mental training would produce an active mind engaged with the distinctions that are causally relevant to one’s goals, a mind that can hold complex structures, manipulate abstract representations, and evaluate novel combinations of rules?

The research on “cognitive transfer” (whether skills gained in one domain generalize to others) is notoriously mixed. A 2016 meta-analysis by Giovanni Sala and Fernand Gobet, published in Educational Research Review, found that while chess instruction showed moderate effects on mathematics in studies using passive controls, those effects shrank toward zero when active control groups were used, suggesting placebo effects rather than genuine cognitive transfer. In a 2017 follow-up in Current Directions in Psychological Science, the same researchers surveyed their meta-analyses of chess, music, and working memory training, concluding that far transfer (the generalization of skills across loosely related domains) “remains a chimera.” This is an important caveat: no single activity reliably produces domain-general cognitive improvement.

However, if the standard is not domain-general cognitive transformation but specific, measurable skill acquisition, then structured reasoning activities fare better, not because they produce general wisdom, but because they produce identifiable, testable competencies:

  1. Chess puzzles train pattern recognition within their domain.
  2. The Android app Code breaking trains the capacity to hold abstract permutations and update hypotheses.
  3. Logic grid puzzles like Einstein’s Riddle train the visualization of constraint satisfaction: the solver must hold in mind the space of all possible assignments and progressively narrow it down.
  4. Deck-building games like Dominion train adaptive planning, since fixed strategies cannot be memorized when the available cards change every game.

Such activities do not claim to produce enlightenment. They claim to produce people who are better at specific kinds of thinking, and that claim is testable.

Debate and journaling deserve special emphasis. Writing down thoughts and reasoning about which positions are more defensible and why trains the mind to operate under adversarial conditions, where comfortable assumptions are challenged. A substantial literature in psychology and education, including Deanna Kuhn’s The Skills of Argument (1991) on the development of argumentative reasoning and Richard Paul’s work on critical thinking pedagogy, supports the view that the deliberate practice of argumentation improves the quality of reasoning, at least within the domains practiced. This is closer to the experimental attitude than meditation.

Although the “Mozart effect” has been largely debunked as a generalized cognitive enhancer, slow, melodically rich music is plausibly a training ground for sustained, structured attention, what the Neoplatonist model would call the presence of organized content that draws the mind into focus rather than the absence of content.

Intellectual honesty requires acknowledging that the evidence for these alternatives is, like the evidence for meditation, weaker and more domain-specific than their advocates typically suggest. The difference is that these activities do not claim access to ultimate reality. They claim only to improve particular skills, and that modesty is itself an epistemic virtue.

Genius Is Retarded

It is important to argue that humans don’t have transcendent intelligence. Fascist discourse thrives on praising human brilliance, and by proxy, the so-called brilliance of the world’s leaders.

Rather than there being a general skill called “intelligence”, humans can do 3 things: 1. Observe objects, 2. track their movements in memory, whether internal or external, and 3. reason about the recorded movements of objects. This reasoning takes the form of a) objective accounting and b) extrapolations, i.e. educated guessing.

Accounting alone is insufficient for survival. There is no such thing as an ability to guess correctly in the general case. In that sense, intelligence doesn’t exist.

Claims of greater intelligence is either greater diligence in (1), (2), (3a) and/or (3b), self-delusion, or a power play to claim authoritarian supremacy over others. It is when we overcome the delusion of intelligence that we can dedicate ourselves to true diligence in practicing (1), (2), (3a) and (3b) with full transparency about what we are doing to ourselves and others.

Personally, I do believe in human brilliance, but it’s a kind of brilliance that can’t easily be praised through cheap bluster. Any cheap bluster you come up with to praise STEM skills, for example, is liable to being co-opted for figures like Musk. It is precisely the cheap descriptions that are transferable to fascists, not the behaviors themselves. Musk is not himself an engineer.

I’m with Spinoza in seeing the knowledge of specific things as our salvation. It would make me happy to see progressive mass movements sweep society, but since the world functions through feedback loops, such silver linings inevitably distract us from the clouds gathering on the horizon. Lasting joy is a quiet thing that comes from seeing your own despair slotted seamlessly into the world, seen like a set of interconnected Lego bricks.

This in no way implies we should not try our utmost to secure temporal happiness. Being idiots about it is one of the avenues that lead to fascism.

Ruins

I. The Cloudy Lens

The fog of a January morning in Shobhabazar coated the tongue with particulate matter and river damp and the faintly sweet residue of last night’s garbage fires. You breathed it in and it became part of you. The distinction between body and city dissolved in that grey, chemical intimacy.

I wandered aimlessly.

The alleys of North Kolkata are not streets in any functional sense. They are the residue of a spatial logic that predates the grid. They twist and double back and dead-end into courtyards where a hundred-year-old banyan has buckled the paving stones, and then they open suddenly onto a main road with its diesel roar, and then they swallow you again.

I had been walking these alleys for fourteen months with a camera around my neck. A Soviet-era Jupiter lens, 58mm f/2, screwed onto a body I’d bought second-hand from a retiring photojournalist in Gariahat. The bokeh was swirly and imperfect. The chromatic aberration at the edges produced a faint halo around bright objects, a smearing of colour at the periphery.

In the viewfinder: an old man on a stone step beneath a doorway whose lintel bore the cracked remains of a Corinthian capital, Greek ornament grafted onto Bengali brick by some long-dead mason who had learned his craft from a colonial pattern book. The old man wore a shawl the colour of ash. His eyes were open, but they were looking at nothing I could identify. His hands rested on his knees, palms up. The posture of a man who has stopped expecting to receive anything.

I pressed the shutter. The mirror slapped.

I was thirty-one years old. I lived in a rented room above an ayurvedic shop in Baghbazar, and the rent was two months overdue, and the landlord, Mr. Pal, had begun leaving notes under my door written in a hand so apologetic it made me want to weep. Before my twenty-sixth birthday, before the argument with my father that ended with a door slamming and a silence that had now lasted five years, I had been someone with prospects. A position at a media conglomerate, a salary in lakhs, a business card on cream stock. When I refused, my father wasn’t angry. He looked at me like he saw me for the first time.

I became, in the language of my relatives, a cautionary tale.

II. The Fish Seller and the Bookseller

The market in Baghbazar was six minutes from the flat if you walked quickly and did not stop to talk to anyone, which in this neighbourhood was a physical impossibility.

But I tried. I needed food and I needed to get back to the darkroom. I put on my sandals. I went down the stairs. I turned left.

The lane hit me. The heat: already thick, pre-monsoon. The ground: uneven, cracked pavement and packed earth, a topography of municipal neglect my feet knew better than my mind. Walls close enough to touch, painted in pale blue and green and pink, peeling to reveal older layers beneath. A child sat in a doorway, drawing in the dust with a stick. The drawing was a circle. Or a wheel. Or the sun. She did not look up.

I did not make it past Jotsna.

Jotsna Begum had been selling fish in this market for thirty years. She sat on a low stool behind a stone slab, surrounded by trays of rohu and katla, her arms thick from the work of lifting and cutting, her hands always wet, her sari tucked up at her knees. She had opinions about everything and shared them with the indifference to reception that comes from either supreme confidence or complete exhaustion, and in Jotsna’s case I suspected it was both.

“Rohu?” she said.

She reached for one. Considered it. Put it back. Reached for another. “This one. Better eyes.”

“The fish’s eyes?”

“What other eyes? Clear eyes, fresh fish. Cloudy eyes, yesterday’s fish. Didn’t you go to Presidency College?” She wrapped the fish in newspaper. “Have you eaten rice?”

“Usually.”

“Usually.” She said the word the way you’d say the name of a disease. “My daughter Nasreen, the one with the scholarship, she also says usually. Usually means no.”

“Mashi ma, I…”

“Eighty rupees. And eat the rice. All the rice.”

I paid. Her hands were wet against mine. She smelled of fish and the particular red Lifebuoy soap the women of this market had used since before I was born.

“Did you see the notice?” I asked.

Her face changed. The muscles around her mouth tightened, and her eyes, which had been conducting the transaction with the easy authority of three decades, went flat.

“I saw it.”

“What do you think?”

“I think they will do what they always do. I think we will do what we always do. And I think the fish don’t care either way.” She paused. “Go. Eat.”

Deb told me later. He was buying antacids at the next stall and he saw it. Jotsna watching me go. Jotsna looking at the notice on the opposite wall (municipal notice, white paper, black text) and then touching her own wrist, briefly, where a glass bangle had cracked the week before. “She did it like this,” Deb said, circling his own wrist with two fingers. Nasreen, when I mentioned it months later, went quiet and said: “Our mother used to do that.”

On Tuesdays and Thursdays, I visited the bookshop on College Street.

Jahan sat behind a desk buried under books since at least the early 1990s. A small clearing had been maintained for a cup of tea and an ashtray. He no longer smoked but the ashtray remained, and he sometimes placed things in it that were not cigarettes: a pencil stub, a button, a folded piece of paper with a phone number he no longer remembered.

He was small and round and bald, with thick glasses that magnified his eyes to an amphibian size. He had taught political science for thirty-four years and had been retired in circumstances he described variously as “a principled refusal to participate in the commodification of education” and “they wanted someone who would teach from PowerPoint and I threw the projector out the window.”

He was also translating a novel.

The manuscript occupied a second clearing on the desk, smaller than the tea clearing, defended on all sides by stacks of Gramsci and Lukács. Loose pages covered in blue ballpoint, the handwriting growing less steady over the years. Farid Hossain’s Nodi O Golokdhandha, or The River and the Labyrinth, published in 1936. Forty-three copies sold before the publisher went bankrupt and the remaining stock was eaten by silverfish. Hossain was a rice farmer’s son from Mymensingh who taught himself Sanskrit, Persian, and English from borrowed books and then disappeared. The novel was rediscovered in 1987 by a graduate student who found a copy in a jute sack in her grandmother’s attic.

Jahan had been translating it for six years.

“The problem,” he said on a Thursday in January, lifting a volume of Gramsci to reveal a plate of mishti doi he had hidden beneath it, “is this sentence.”

He read it aloud: Griho bole kichhu nei; shudhu dhore achhe bolei griho.

“There is no such thing as home. Only the holding makes it home.” He set the book down. “That is what the words say. That is not what the sentence means.”

“What does the sentence mean?”

“Dhore achhe: is holding, keeps holding, continues to hold. The present continuous with a stative aspect. The way you hold a child who is trying to run into traffic. The way you hold a door shut against wind. The holding is not serene, Anirban. It is effortful, ongoing, possibly futile. And Hossain puts it in this form deliberately. The home does not exist because someone held it once. It exists only while someone is still holding.”

He picked up the pen. He wrote: dwelling. He crossed it out. He wrote: abode. He crossed that out too. “Nobody says abode. The word belongs to real estate listings and Victorian elites.” He put the pen down and reached for the mishti doi. “I have been sitting with this word for six years. The word is winning.”

I peeled the foil from the yoghurt and ate it with the small wooden spoon he kept in a jar on the shelf. The yoghurt was cold and sweet, the best argument against despair.

“Your photographs,” Jahan said, pivoting without warning, as he always did when a conversation had reached its natural limit. “You photograph the ruins and see in them damaged life. Fine. But what you don’t see is that the ruins are also evidence of resistance. These buildings should have been demolished decades ago. From the perspective of capital, they are a waste of land. And yet here they are. Because people live in them.”

“You romanticise them. They stay because they can’t afford to leave.”

“And your despair is merely the luxury of a man who has never had to stay.”

This was the argument we always had. Circular by design. And then we ate mishti doi and talked about cricket.

“And the blog?” he asked, with the exaggerated innocence he used when he wanted to wound. “Three posts, was it? Eleven readers?”

“Twelve readers now,” I said. “I checked.”

“Twelve! A literary movement. Alert the Desh editorial board.” He put down the yoghurt spoon. “But you should write more. Even to no one. Especially to no one. Hossain wrote to forty-three people and the silverfish, and the silverfish were his most attentive audience, and here I am the better part of a century later trying to translate him. You do not know who your twelve are.”

III. Nandini

Her father died when she was sixteen. Heart attack. Monday morning, at the bus stop. She told me what she remembered most was not the grief. She remembered the arithmetic. Her mother at the dining table. Calculator. Stack of papers. The provident fund. The insurance. The savings. The rent. The school fees. The insulin. Adding them. Adding them again.

The numbers did not add up. She told me this: that it was watching her mother’s face over that calculator that she understood, at sixteen, the shape her life would take. It did not need your consent. It needed only your hunger, and your mother’s hunger, and your sister’s hunger.

She went to the balcony. A cup of tea she knew she would forget to drink. The sodium-lit street. Twenty minutes of not thinking about anything. She once told me, offhandedly, “The balcony is the best part of my day.”

I noticed her before the mynah flew.

Three days after the gallery-owner Sandeep first offered me an exhibition (an offer I had refused, or believed I had) I went down to the Hooghly. There was a ghat south of Ahiritola that few people used anymore. The banyan tree at the ghat was a monument to a different kind of time: aerial roots that had descended and thickened into secondary trunks, creating a colonnade of living wood. The roots had entered the stonework and prised it apart with a slow, incontestable force.

Near the far end of the ghat, a man slept under a torn blanket. His possessions were arranged beside him with a precision that seemed deliberate: a plastic bag knotted at the top, a steel water bottle, a pair of rubber chappals placed side by side with their soles facing up, the way you place shoes outside a temple. One chappal had a broken strap, mended with a loop of wire twisted into a neat, workmanlike knot.

She was standing about twenty metres upriver, where the ghat dissolved into rubble. Hard hat, clipboard, speaking to a man in a high-visibility vest with the authority of someone accustomed to making decisions.

“Can I help you?” she called. The tone was not friendly.

“I’m photographing the ghat.”

“The ghat is scheduled for demolition assessment.”

“That’s why I’m photographing it.”

Up close: dark circles under her eyes and a small scar on her chin, silvery, the kind from a childhood fall.

“So you’re one of those,” she said. “Heritage photographers. You take pictures of the ruins, post them with some poetic caption about Kolkata’s vanishing soul, and go home. Then you act like you are helping those who live here.”

“And you’re one of those. Development professionals. You transform a neighbourhood that has been continuously inhabited for two hundred years into a vacant lot.”

She laughed. A short, hard sound.

“I have a mother with diabetes and a younger sister in college,” she said. “If you have a theory that explains how I should feed my family while refusing to participate in the economy, I’d love to hear it.”

I had such a theory. Standing on the broken ghat, with the Hooghly sliding past and the banyan’s roots gripping the stones, this was not the right place to say it.

“I don’t,” I said.

She looked at me for a long moment. Then she nodded, once, as though I had passed a test I hadn’t known I was taking.

“Good,” she said.

We met over the following months. Always in the margins of the city: a tea stall near the Marble Palace, a bench at a decommissioned jute mill in Howrah, the rooftop of Jahan’s building. These meetings were not dates. We sat near each other and sometimes we talked and sometimes we didn’t, and the silence between us was not empty.

At the jute mill, she brought food. Luchi and cholar dal, packed in a tiffin carrier. “My mother made too much,” she said. This was a lie, and we both knew it.

I had not eaten cholar dal since the argument with my father. The sweetness of the coconut, the faint heat of the whole red chilli, and I was in the kitchen in Shobhabazar, my mother’s hands dusty with flour.

“The worst part,” she told me, “is that I’m good at it. I understand buildings. I can walk into a structure and feel where the loads are concentrated. We could be repairing buildings. Instead I write their death sentences.”

On Jahan’s rooftop, a Tuesday evening in February. The sunset was the kind Kolkata produces in winter: a slow burn through the pollution, the light thickening to amber. She sat on the low parapet wall and unlaced her shoes and let her feet hang over the edge.

She had brought oranges. She peeled one and handed me half without speaking, and we ate in silence.

“The sunset is doing something illegal,” she said.

“What?”

“Those colours. No building code permits those colours.”

I laughed unguardedly. She looked at me with delight.

“You should do that more.”

“Laugh?”

“Live in the moment.”

Below us, Jahan emerged from his shop and looked up and saw us, and he raised one hand in a wave so small it might have been a benediction, and went back inside.

She put her head on my shoulder. It lasted approximately four minutes and in those four minutes I thought about nothing. The weight of her head. Orange peel. Amber light on the water tanks. A train somewhere.

Then her phone rang (her mother, asking about dinner) and we climbed down and said goodbye at the corner, and I walked home with the taste of orange in my mouth, and I did not photograph a single thing.

At the jute mill, a Saturday. Rain on the corrugated roof, a sound like static. We were sitting on the concrete loading dock, legs hanging, sharing a packet of chanachur she had bought from a stall outside.

She talked about buildings. Not the way she talked about them when she was arguing with me. She talked about them the way Jahan talked about sentences.

“When a building is working,” she said, “you can feel it. The loads move down through the structure in a way that makes sense. Column to beam to column to foundation. Heritage buildings were built by people who understood this. Some of them have been standing for two hundred years.”

The rain thickened. She wiped her hands on her jeans.

“Buildings made from the cheapest steel, the concrete mixed to the minimum grade that will pass inspection- those don’t last so long.”

She stopped. She looked at me.

“That’s what I do, Anirban. I go to a building that someone built with their hands, and I measure the cracks, and I enter the numbers, and the numbers say the building should come down, and the numbers are correct. The building is structurally unsound. The loads have shifted. The foundation has settled unevenly. All true. But the building is also still standing. And the numbers don’t have a code for ‘still standing despite everything.’ There’s no field for that.”

She was quiet for a moment.

“D3 means the building’s structural capacity has degraded below fifty percent of its original design load. E2-Lead means environmental hazard, lead paint. Non-conforming means it doesn’t meet current code. Three codes. Behind the three codes there’s a kitchen where a woman has been cooking for thirty years. The codes don’t know the cooking, the cooking doesn’t care about the codes, and I’m the one standing in between them.”

She ate another piece of chanachur.

“I keep thinking there should be a fourth code. Something like: H1. Human habitation, active, ongoing. But there isn’t one. And I’m not the one who gets to invent it.”

The rain stopped. We sat for a while in the dripping silence.

IV. Jahan’s Word

On a shelf behind the desk, half-hidden by a stack of journals, there was a photograph I had never asked about. A woman in a cotton sari, mid-laugh, holding a steel plate of rice. Jahan’s wife. She had died in 2011.

He told me about her on a Tuesday in late January, unprompted, as though the sentence had been waiting and the day had finally arrived.

“When she was alive, this shop was a home. I slept in the back room. She brought food. She complained about the dust and the books and the dust on the books. She rearranged things. I rearranged them back. The rearranging was the marriage.” He cleaned his glasses on the hem of his kurta and put them back on. “After she died, the shop became a shop. The same books, the same desk, the same dust. But the movement had stopped. The verb is the problem.”

He pushed the manuscript page toward me. On it, crossed out in various inks, were the attempts:

There is no dwelling; only the act of dwelling makes it so. There is no home. Only the holding makes one. There is no belonging. Only the holding on.

He said, “English has no word for the process by which a space becomes a home through the sustained effort of human attention. English has homemaking, but that means curtains. It has dwelling, but Heidegger ruined that. What Hossain means is something closer to: the home is not a place but a verb, and the verb is in the continuous tense, and when you stop performing it, the place reverts to mere space.”

He picked up the pen. He wrote: There is no home. Only the holding makes it home.

He stared at it.

“Makes it home. It almost works. But Hossain’s sentence has weight. This one could be on a greeting card.” He crossed it out.

I said: “What if you used holding on?”

He considered this. “Holding on suggests desperation. Hossain means something both more desperate and more ordinary. Not the holding on of a man clinging to a cliff but the holding on of a woman who carries her cooking pot down to wherever the river has gone this morning and starts looking for stones to build a new stove. The ordinary kind. The kind that doesn’t know it’s brave.”

He put the pen down.

“There is a passage in chapter fourteen,” he said. “Monimala’s daughter is stitching a kantha. The daughter’s work is ugly: crooked stitches, threads too loose. The mother says nothing. The daughter finishes. Monimala folds it and puts it on the bed. And Hossain writes…” He opened the water-damaged book and read: “‘The stitching was not in the cloth. The stitching was in the act of stitching. When the cloth tears, the act remains in the hands.'”

He closed the book. “I have been trying to translate that sentence for two years. The problem is the word selai. It means stitching but also joining, mending, the act of making whole. English separates these. Hossain does not.”

“I will die before I finish this translation,” he said, with the calm of a man stating a weather prediction.

“Don’t be dramatic.”

“I am seventy-seven years old and I have had two heart episodes and the building has been sold. I am not being dramatic.”

I had not known the building had been sold. The notice, I learned later, had been sitting in the ashtray for three weeks, under the pencil stub.

V. The Exhibition

I agreed to the exhibition because I was broke. Sandeep moved fast. Within a week: a title, The Architecture of Decay, and a catalogue essay that praised the photographs’ “lyrical melancholy.” The word capitalism did not appear.

I delivered forty-seven prints mounted on acid-free board. The grain of the film, which on the contact sheets had felt like rough truth, now looked only artistic. At the opening, I stood in a corner and watched strangers consume what had not been made for them. A man I did not know pointed at the photograph of the doorway on Muktaram Babu Street and said to his wife, “We should get a print for the guest room.” The guest room. The doorway where Harun Miah had lived for forty years was being considered for the guest room. I wanted to leave. I did not leave. The wine was free and I was broke and the hypocrisy was complete.

And then I saw Mrs. Dasgupta.

A woman of seventy from my mother’s Rabindrasangeet circle, cropped white hair, hearing aid. She was standing before a photograph of an empty doorway on Muktaram Babu Street. Afternoon light falling on a worn stone threshold, and on the threshold a pair of children’s rubber sandals, placed neatly side by side. She reached out and touched the glass. Her finger rested above the sandals. Not briefly. Three full seconds, which is a long time to touch a photograph in a room full of people. The room went on around her. She did not notice.

She turned, and her eyes were wet. She found me. I don’t know how she knew which one I was.

“My grandson,” she said. “He had sandals like that. Blue ones. With a buckle.”

She did not say anything else. She moved on to the next photograph, and she looked at it without seeing it, and then she left.

Nandini stopped in front of the photograph of herself. The one from the ghat: a woman in a hard hat next to a ruined column. She had not known it would be there. I had not asked.

She found me across the room.

“I am not your subject, Anirban.”

She said it quietly. Not for the room. For me.

She walked out of the gallery.

VI. Atish’s Sandals

Mrs. Dasgupta had not planned to write the letter.

She had planned to go to the gallery, look at the photographs, eat a canape if they were serving canapes, and go home. This was what she did now: she went to things. Openings, lectures, concerts at the Rabindra Sadan. She went because the alternative was the flat, and the flat, after Atish, had become a place she could tolerate for only so many hours before the silence shifted from restful to accusatory.

She had not expected to see the sandals. She had not expected the sandals to do what they did: reach into her chest and locate, with the precision of a surgeon, the exact place where Atish’s absence lived.

She wrote the letter the next morning, at the dining table, with the fountain pen Atish had given her for her birthday. A cheap pen, purchased with his mother’s money, wrapped in newspaper because he could not find the tape.

I want to tell you about my grandson. His name was Atish. He died four years ago, of leukaemia, at the age of seven. He had a pair of blue rubber sandals with a buckle that he refused to take off, even in the hospital at the end. The sandals in your photograph are not his. I know this. And yet I felt, for the first time since his death, that someone had seen the hole that Atish left in the world when he went.

Something came back. I wrote to her and asked if I could visit.

Her flat in Bhowanipore was crowded with furniture purchased for a larger space. Every surface held photographs in frames. On the mantelpiece: a boy of six or seven, grinning with the total, unguarded joy children possess. Blue sandals on his feet.

She made tea before I could refuse. The cups were porcelain, gold-rimmed, from a set she must have owned since before I was born. She placed a plate of rosogolla between us and said, “Eat,” with the same authority Jotsna used. Women of this city issued instructions about food the way cops issued warnings about traffic.

She talked about his life. The bottle caps arranged in elaborate patterns on the floor. He called them cities, and each city had a government, and the government of the Pepsi city was at war with the government of the Thumbs Up city, and the war was about water. His insistence that cats could understand Bengali but chose not to speak it. “He was furious about this,” she said. “He thought it was rude of them. He wrote a letter to the cat.” She paused. “I still have the letter.”

She told me about the hospital. Not all of it. The parts that came. How he had asked, near the end, whether the doctors could fix the chess set in the playroom because the white queen was missing and that wasn’t fair to white. How the sandals were under the bed. How, when they came to clear the room, she had taken the sandals and nothing else, because the sandals were the thing her hand found, and you pick up what your hand finds.

“People say he’s in a better place,” she said. “I don’t know about better. I know he’s not here. Here is where the bottle caps are.”

I listened. I was not good at listening. I wanted to shape what I was hearing into something. A structure, a rhythm, the beginning of a sentence. But she wanted a witness. Someone to sit in the chair and hear the name and not look away. So I sat in her crowded flat and drank her tea and heard about a dead boy’s bottle-cap cities, and I was exhausted afterward in a way I had never been exhausted by argument.

I visited again. And again. The fourth time, she showed me the letter to the cat. It was written in large, uneven letters on lined paper, and it said: Dear cat, please talk. I am waiting. From Atish. I held it and my hands were not steady.

She gave me this. I don’t know if that means I can use it. I am using it. I put it on this page.

VII. Death of the Bookseller

The building on College Street had been purchased by a development group registered in Mumbai. Jahan’s lease, renewed on a handshake for three decades, had no legal standing. The new owners intended to convert the space into a co-working hub.

He fought. The court said the lease was unregistered. The heritage commission said the building was not listed. The newspapers did not respond.

On March 28th I went to the shop and found him smaller than usual. The translation manuscript was on the desk. He had been working on chapter fourteen, Monimala’s daughter and the kantha.

“The banyan tree,” he said. “At the ghat. You showed me the photograph. The roots breaking the stonework.”

“Yes.”

“That is what they are doing to me with notices.”

I wanted to say something. What came out was: “You haven’t finished the translation.”

“No.” He looked at the manuscript. “Hossain is right in Bengali. I have gotten him partway across the river. Perhaps partway is enough.”

On April 3rd, Jahan suffered a massive cardiac arrest in the shop. He was found by the cha wallah who delivered his morning tea, slumped over the desk, his hand resting on an open copy of Gramsci’s Prison Notebooks. The page was marked with a bus ticket.

The ambulance took twenty-two minutes. It did not matter.

I walked to College Street. The shop was closed. A padlock on the door I had never seen. The cha wallah was standing outside with two cups of tea, one of which was for Jahan, and he was holding both because he did not know what else to do with the second one.

I took it and drank it standing in the street. It was too sweet, the way Jahan liked it.

I went home and sat in the dark for a very long time.

Before the shop was cleared, I went back with a key Jahan had given me months ago. I found the manuscript in the clearing on the desk, under the Lukács. Two hundred and twelve pages of blue ballpoint. Six years of work. Beside the manuscript, in a separate folder, his notes: cross-references to three different dictionaries, arguments with himself in the margins, small drawings of the river that Hossain described, as though seeing the water might help him hear the words.

The last page he had worked on was chapter nineteen. The passage about the women salvaging what could be salvaged after the flood. He had translated: After the river took the house, the women salvaged what could be salvaged. Cooking pots, clothes, a wooden comb. The men stood and watched the water.

The next sentence was half-finished, crossed out, restarted, abandoned. A space on the page where the words should have been.

I took the manuscript. I took the notes. I left the Gramsci and the Lukács. I took the ashtray.

VIII. Kartik

After the exhibition, after the letter, after Jahan, I started sleeping at the ghat.

Not every night. Some nights. The ones where the room above Mr. Pal’s shop felt less like a room and more like the inside of a camera.

The man with the torn blanket was named Kartik. I learned this on the second night, when he woke and found me sitting against the banyan root, staring at the river.

“What are you doing here?” he asked.

“Thinking.”

“Thinking is free,” he said. “Sleeping is the expensive part.”

Construction worker. Fallen from scaffolding eighteen months ago. Right ankle shattered, healed badly. Family in Murshidabad. Sends nothing. Has nothing.

He told me this the way you tell things at the ghat, without self-pity. In the dark, under the banyan, you tell your story. The oldest technology. Older than the camera.

In the morning he adjusted his possessions. Chappals parallel. Water bottle aligned. Still precise. Still careful.

“Why do you do that?” I asked. “The arranging.”

He looked at me as though I had asked why he breathed. “If you don’t keep things in order, how do you know where you are?”

A few nights later: “You had a camera before. I saw you. On the steps. Pointing it at things.”

“Yes.”

“You don’t have it now.”

“No.”

He was quiet. Then: “My wife sews. In Murshidabad. She makes kantha. Old saris, she stitches them together. When I worked, I sent money and she sent kantha. One for each season. I had four.” He paused. “They were in the room I rented. When I couldn’t pay, the landlord kept them. He kept four kantha for two months’ rent. The stitching in those, my wife’s hands are in those. You understand? In the stitching.”

“I can leave whenever I want,” I said. “You can’t. That’s the difference.”

“Yes,” he said. “That’s the difference.” He adjusted the water bottle. Half an inch to the left.

A week later. Morning. The river grey and slow. Kartik was doing something I had not seen him do before: exercises. Methodical, careful movements, the kind a physiotherapist teaches. He was stretching the bad ankle, rotating it in small circles, wincing when it caught.

“The doctor at the free clinic,” he said. “She told me to do this every morning. She said the ankle will never be what it was but it can be better than what it is.” He rotated again. Winced again. “She also said I should eat more protein. I told her I would pass the message to my chef.”

He laughed at his own joke. A short sound, surprised, as though he had misplaced his sense of humour and found it in an unexpected pocket.

I had brought tea. Two cups, from the stall at the top of the ghat steps. He took one without comment. We drank.

“You want to know something?” he said. “The scaffolding I fell from. The contractor said it was safe. I knew it wasn’t. The cross-braces were tied with wire, not bolted. I could see it. But the foreman said go up, so I went up. Because the day’s wage was four hundred rupees and my wife needed thread for the kantha and my son needed a school uniform and the uniform cost six hundred rupees and if I worked one and a half days I could send the money.”

He finished the tea.

“That’s what your buildings come down to, Anirban. Not the loads. Not the codes. The four hundred rupees. The school uniform. A man who knows the scaffolding is bad and goes up anyway because his son needs a uniform. A man like me has nothing to bargain with except his willingness to climb.”

I did not write this down. I did not reach for the camera. The camera, by then, was in a box under my bed. One morning I reached for the camera and my hand stopped. The strap was dusty. The lens cap was on. I left it.

IX. Demolitions

Nandini told me this later, when she could bring herself to. Municipal Form 7-C, Application for Structural Clearance and Redevelopment. Filed fourteen months before the machines arrived. Stamped, countersigned, forwarded to the Ward Committee, returned for a missing signature, re-filed, forwarded again. “Somewhere in the process,” she said, “a line gets added to a spreadsheet. Block number. Status: Cleared. That’s it. That’s the moment. A clerk you will never meet types a word into a cell, and the building is already gone. The bulldozer is a formality.”

The bulldozers arrived at six in the morning. By the time I reached Muktaram Babu Street at seven-thirty, the first building was already half gone. A swing of the arm, a bite of the bucket, a cascade of brick and plaster.

Harun Miah, the retired schoolteacher at number 14, was sitting on a plastic chair on the pavement with his wife Rehana. I sat beside them. I did not know what to say.

Rehana was holding a framed photograph. She said: “The photograph is wrong. It’s from Meher’s wedding. I should have taken the one with all of us. But you pick up what your hand finds.”

In the courtyard of number 14, a guava tree was still standing, its roots exposed where the floor had been torn away.

I helped carry what could be carried. A cooking pot. A stack of saris in a plastic bag. A box of papers: documents, certificates, the paperwork of a life. A framed diploma, University of Calcutta, 1971. The glass was cracked. The box was heavier than it looked. I lifted it wrong and my back seized and I shifted it against my hip the way I had seen the women at the market carry baskets.

At noon, Nandini arrived. No hard hat. No clipboard. Ordinary clothes. She walked through the police barrier because the officers recognised her.

She stood in the rubble of a building she had condemned, hands at her sides. The dust settled on her shoulders.

I had nothing with which to take a photo.

By six in the evening, the first block was gone. On the perimeter, a chain-link fence. COMING SOON: HERITAGE HEIGHTS / LUXURY RESIDENCES INSPIRED BY OLD KOLKATA.

Within a week, the chain-link had rerouted the foot traffic that once passed Jotsna’s stall. She moved six metres east, to a spot near the pharmacy. Nasreen told me her mother’s sales were down by a third. Six metres.

In the rubble. Evening, the demolition crew gone, the chain-link casting long shadows.

She said: “You put my photograph in that gallery. Without asking. You took my face and hung it on a wall.” She pressed her palms against her knees. “And it’s not just the photograph. It’s that I can’t leave Apex. My mother’s insulin. Rupa’s tuition. The rent. And you’ve built your whole life around refusing, around staying outside, and I can’t get out, and you won’t come in…”

She stopped. She stood up. She brushed the dust from her clothes.

“Goodbye, Anirban.”

She walked away through the rubble, her steps sure. The sodium lights caught her for a moment. Then she turned a corner.

X. The Guava Tree

I wrote a blog post.

I wrote about Rehana’s photograph and the bulldozer. I wrote about Jotsna and the fish and the clear eyes and the thirty years. I did not write about Jotsna’s stall moving six metres, because six metres would not stand for anything, even though six metres had cost her a third of her income. I did not write that she complained about the light: “The fish look different here. The scales. I can’t read them the same” or that thirty years of assessing freshness in one particular slant of morning light now had to be recalibrated to a new position, and nobody with a clipboard would record that this, too, was a demolition. I wrote about the guava tree, because the guava tree would stand for something. I chose the images that would photograph well.

I read it at the next meeting. My hands were trembling. I held my phone and read for six minutes.

When I stopped, the room was quiet.

A young man near the door, early twenties, sparse beard, jaw set hard, a plastic bag of onions hanging from his wrist, said: “My mother works in a garment factory in Topsia. She takes three buses. When they demolish this neighbourhood, she will take four buses, or five, or she will lose the job. That is what a bulldozer does. It doesn’t demolish a building. It adds a bus.” He looked at me. “You wrote about the guava tree. My mother doesn’t have a guava tree. She has a bus pass. Will you write about the bus pass?”

The guava tree was easier to write about. The guava tree stood for something. The bus pass stood for nothing except itself. A laminated card, a route, a woman’s hours.

The young man walked out, the onions swinging against his knee. The meeting continued around the silence like water around a stone.

That night I opened the blog. The cursor blinked. I tried to write about the bus pass.

I wrote: A woman takes three buses to a garment factory in Topsia.

I wrote: The fare is eight rupees. The pass costs three hundred and ten rupees per month.

I wrote: When they demolish this neighbourhood she will

I wrote: The bus pass is

I wrote: She

I do not know her name. I do not know the route number. I do not know if she sits or stands. The cursor blinked. The guava tree was easier. The guava tree had roots and fruit and metaphor. The bus pass had a laminate coating and a fare and a woman I had not spoken to and would not speak to and this sentence is not going anywhere either.

I did not delete and I did not continue.

I published the blog post. The one about the guava tree, not the one about the bus pass, because the one about the bus pass did not exist, because I could not write it.

Twelve views. The faithful twelve. Then an activist shared it. Then a journalist ran it on page three. Then a professor of postcolonial literature at SOAS shared it with a comment about messages in a bottle.

None of this stopped the demolition. The bulldozers continued. Heritage Heights would be built. Form 7-C had done its work months ago. The rest was scenery.

Jotsna, when someone read it aloud to her at the market, said: “He got the fish right.” Then: “He says my hand is cold. My hand is not cold. My hand is the temperature of the fish.” She paused. “But yes. He got the fish right.”

My hand is not cold. My hand is the temperature of the fish. I had written cold in the blog post. Cold was wrong. I knew it was wrong when I wrote it. I wrote it because it was the nearest word, and the nearest word is not the right word.

XI. The Unfinished Translation

In the evenings, after the meetings, I sat at the desk (a hollow-core door across two filing cabinets) and I worked on Jahan’s translation.

He had finished nineteen of twenty-four chapters. The remaining five were in various states: chapter twenty existed as a rough draft with question marks; chapters twenty-one and twenty-two had notes but no prose; the final two were bare, just the original Bengali, photocopied from the water-damaged book, with occasional words circled and arrows pointing to nothing.

I was not a translator. I was a photographer who read too much. But Jahan’s unfinished manuscript pulled at me in a way the camera no longer did.

The last sentence of the novel. I found it on a loose sheet in the back of the folder, in Jahan’s handwriting, with a note in the margin that said only: close but not right.

The river will not return to where it was. The village will not return to where it was. But the building, the act of building, the continuous, stubborn, unreasonable act of making a place where there was no place: this does not end. It does not end because it was never about the house. It was about the hands.

Close but not right. I sat with it the way Jahan had sat with griho. A man who had walked out of his father’s house five years ago, who had not called, who had let the silence harden into something structural, sitting in a rented room trying to translate the word for home. My father’s expression at the door: not anger, something closer to recognition. Perhaps he had seen it: that I would leave, and that the leaving would not be the freedom I mistook it for. The holding, Hossain says, is effortful. I had stopped performing the verb.

In chapter fourteen, the kantha passage, Jahan had left the sentence unfinished. The stitching was not in the cloth. The stitching was in the act of… And then nothing. A dash and a space.

I thought of Kartik. My wife’s hands are in the stitching.

Kartik’s sentence and Hossain’s sentence were the same sentence. A construction worker from Murshidabad and a rice farmer’s son from Mymensingh, eighty years apart, saying the same thing about hands and cloth, and neither of them had read the other. It was the same knowledge arriving from the same place: from the body, from the hands, from the act of making a thing that can be taken away but whose making cannot.

I wrote Kartik’s words into the margin of Jahan’s manuscript, in pencil, beside the unfinished sentence. I put the pencil down. I picked it up again. I did not erase what I had written.

I worked on the remaining chapters through the summer. I did not finish. I got partway through chapter twenty-one and the prose stopped coming. The Bengali was there on the photocopied page but the English would not form. The sentences I produced were mine, not Hossain’s, and I could see the difference the way Jotsna could see the difference between a fresh fish and yesterday’s fish. My sentences had cloudy eyes.

The last sentence remained on the loose sheet: close but not right. I left it there.

Nandini comes to the ghat in September.

I do not expect her. She stands at the top of the steps in ordinary clothes, no hard hat, and looks down at the banyan and the river and at me sitting against the root with the manuscript on my knees.

She sits down. Not close.

“I’m not here about us,” she says. “I came to tell you something.”

She has been reassigned. New project. Residential development in Howrah. She is surveying a block of sixty-year-old workers’ housing. Families of jute mill labourers, three generations deep.

“I typed the codes,” she says. “D3. E2. Non-conforming. Same as before. Same template. Same fields.”

She picks up a stone from the ghat step and turns it in her fingers.

“Then I opened a second file. My own file. Not Apex’s. I started recording the things the template doesn’t have fields for. How many families. How long they’ve been there. What the building does that the codes can’t measure.” She pauses. “The woman on the third floor has a tulsi plant on the balcony railing. The railing is rusted through. The plant is the only green thing on the block. She waters it every morning from a plastic jug. There’s no field for that.”

“What will you do with the file?”

“I don’t know. Give it to a journalist. Give it to anyone who can use it before the codes are all that’s left.”

She puts the stone down. Aligns it with the edge of the step, the way you set a plumb line.

“The building is unsound. I’m not lying about that. D3 is correct. The loads have shifted. But there’s a difference between a building that should come down and a building that someone decides to bring down. The codes don’t distinguish. I’m going to distinguish.”

She stands up.

“Don’t write about this. Don’t put me in your blog. This isn’t material. It’s just what I’m going to do.”

She leaves the way she came, up the ghat steps, sure-footed. I watch her go and I do not reach for a pen or a camera or a sentence. She has said what she means in the language she has, and it is built to hold weight.

I am writing about it. She told me not to. This is the second time I have taken something of hers without asking.

XII. The Morning

No camera. No lens. No focal length, no aperture, no shutter speed. The eye alone.

Morning. The ghat. The river the colour of dark tea from a roadside stall, the kind that costs five rupees and comes in a clay cup you break when you are done.

The banyan tree. A bird, small and brown, sits on a root and tilts its head and looks at me, and I look back, and for a moment something passes between us.

Beside me, Kartik coughs in his sleep and turns over and mutters something about scaffolding, and the word enters the morning. The cough is real in a way that the silence was not quite real. The morning light is on the river, on the tree, on Kartik’s torn blanket, on the manuscript in my lap. The same light. It does not know whose it is.

Kartik did not choose this. I can leave whenever I want. He can’t.

I open the manuscript, Jahan’s translation, the thing I have not finished and may not finish, and I look at the last sentence, the one he marked close but not right. The verb is in the continuous tense.

In the margin, in pencil, Kartik’s words next to Hossain’s unfinished sentence about the kantha. Not the cloth. The stitching. The same knowledge from two men who never read each other, arriving in the same place, from the hands.

I close the manuscript.

The city is awake behind me. I can hear it starting. The buses, the autorickshaws, the market opening.

And a woman is on a bus.

Route S47, the 5:14 from Topsia depot. Fare: eight rupees. Three transfers. S47 to the Gariahat interchange, then the 215 to Sealdah, then a minibus whose number changes depending on the day because the route is not fixed, because the route is patched together from the decisions of private operators who adjust it according to demand and diesel prices and which roads are flooded this week. She has a laminated monthly pass. The pass costs three hundred and ten rupees. She carries it in a plastic sleeve inside her bag. Her son. I do not know her son’s name. I know he has a name. I know the onions are for dinner. I know this because I asked, after the meeting, I went and asked Rashed, and Rashed asked the young man, and the young man told him some of it, and the rest I do not know, and the not-knowing is not a place from which I can write a good sentence about the human condition.

Route S47. Fare: eight rupees. Departure: 5:14 AM.

I am putting it here because I do not know where else to put it.

Translation: এই মেঘলা দিনে একলা

Another legendary song by Gauriprasanna Mazumder: https://youtu.be/-eaDa50epZM

এই মেঘলা দিনে একলা
Alone on this cloudy day

ঘরে থাকেনা তো মন
My mind doesn’t stay at home

কাছে যাবো কবে পাবো
Getting close to you, when will I get,

ওগো তোমার নিমন্ত্রণ
My dear, your invitation?

যূথীবনে ঐ হাওয়া
In the flower forest, that wind

করে শুধু আসা যাওয়া
Only comes and goes.

হায় হায়রে দিন যায়রে
Alas, alas, the days pass

ভরে আঁধারে ভুবন
Darkness fills the world.

কাছে যাবো কবে পাবো
Getting close to you, when will I get,

ওগো তোমার নিমন্ত্রণ
My dear, your invitation?

শুধু ঝরে ঝরো ঝরো
Only showers keep showering

আজ বারি সারাদিন
Today, waters, all day

আজ যেন মেঘে মেঘে
Today, as if, from cloud to cloud,

হলো মন যে উদাসীন
The mind has become melancholy.

আজ আমি ক্ষণে ক্ষণে
Today I, from time to time

কি যে ভাবি আনমনে
Think of I know not what.

তুমি আসবে ওগো হাসবে
You will come, dear, and laugh

কবে হবে সে মিলন
When will our meeting happen?

কাছে যাবো কবে পাবো
Getting close to you, when will I get,

ওগো তোমার নিমন্ত্রণ
My dear, your invitation?

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